Federal mandates and mortgage supply : regression discontinuity analyses of the community reinvestment and GSE Acts. by Bhutta, Neil
Federal Mandates and Mortgage Supply: Regression
Discontinuity Analyses of the Community Reinvestment and
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTEGSE Acts OF TECHNOLOGY
by OCT 1 0 2008
Neil Pravin Bhutta LIBRARIES
B.A., Economics and Physics, Emory University (2000)
Submitted to the Department of Economics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
September 2008
@ 2008 Neil Pravin Bhutta. All rights reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly
paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium
now known or hereafter created.
Signature of Author .. ...................
Department of Economics
n / 29 Ju1F 2008
Certified by................ .................. : ..........................
Michael Greenstone
3M Professor of Environmental Economics
Thesis Supervisor
Certified by ................. .......
David Autor
Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by ................................ .. ...............................
Peter Temin
Elisha Gray II Professor of Economics
Chairperson, Departmental Committee on Graduate Students
ARCHIVES

Federal Mandates and Mortgage Supply:
Regression Discontinuity Analyses of the Community Reinvestment and GSE Acts
By
Neil Pravin Bhutta
Submitted to the Department of Economics
on July 29, 2008 in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I provide evidence of the causal impact on mortgage supply of
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the "Government-Sponsored Enterprises
(GSE) Act", laws requiring banks and the GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac),
respectively, to help improve credit access for low-income households and
neighborhoods. While financial markets evolved rapidly since the early 1990's, I use
discontinuities in the laws' eligibility rules to identify their effects. To implement the
analyses, I use a census of mortgage applications collected under the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act. Overall, these programs appear to have had limited impact.
I first analyze CRA's effect on mortgage lending in targeted neighborhoods:
census tracts with a median family income (MFI) under 80% of MSA MFI. The
regression discontinuity (RD) estimates suggest an overall credit supply shift of at least
$6 billion ($2007) from 1994 and 2002 in targeted neighborhoods. In addition to CRA's
direct effect on bank lending, I also find that unregulated institutions lend more in
targeted tracts ("crowd-in"). Further analysis suggests that information spillovers from
increased bank lending helps generate crowd-in.
In Chapter 2, I examine CRA's effect on home purchase mortgage lending to
households with income under 80% of the MSA MFI. In both Chapters 1 and 2, I find
CRA's impact is concentrated in the largest MSAs, where enforcement is most intense.
The RD estimates indicate that CRA caused a 6% increase in large MSA bank home
purchase lending at the cutoff. Unlike in Chapter 1, there is no theoretical basis for
crowd-in and none is found. Nor do I find that banks crowd-out unregulated institutions.
Finally, I measure the impact of one of the three goals established under the GSE
Act. Under this goal the GSEs target census tracts with MFI under 90% of MSA MFI.
The RD estimates suggest this goal led to a 3-4% increase in GSE purchases, and
increased GSE-eligible originations by 2-3% at the cutoff. Unlike previous research, I
find no evidence that the GSEs crowd-out FHA and subprime loans. The results imply a
lower bound of the goal's impact of $2.4 billion between 1997 and 2002.
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Chapter 1
Giving Credit where Credit is Due? The
Community Reinvestment Act and Mortgage
Lending in Low Income Neighborhoods
1.1. Introduction
The U.S. government has long intervened in credit markets to improve credit
access. Economic and sociological theories suggesting that credit access and
homeownership generate important individual and social benefits such as improved self-
esteem and child outcomes, reduced crime and increased voter turnout often motivate
such policies.' Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 1977 to
ensure that low-income, often predominantly minority, communities have adequate
access to mortgage credit. CRA stipulates that federally insured banks have an
affirmative obligation to supply credit throughout their local market. In practice,
regulators evaluate banks' lending record in low-income neighborhoods and can penalize
non-compliant banks.
CRA's impact on credit supply is cast in doubt, especially since it does not
subsidize banks and does not set explicit lending goals, leaving the determination of bank
compliance to individual regulators' discretion. But changes in CRA enforcement in the
early and mid 1990's likely mounted pressure on banks to expand their CRA-qualified
activity. Indeed, banks increasingly established flexible lending programs and entered
into "CRA lending agreements" since the mid 1990's (see Figure 1; Avery et al 2000).
At the same time, homeownership and household mortgage debt rose dramatically,
drawing attention to CRA. 2 But CRA's impact has not been clearly differentiated from
other major financial market changes, and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
(2007) recently declared, "Distinguishing with certainty the effects that the CRA had on
'CRA-type' activity from the effects of simultaneous regulatory and market changes over
this period has not been possible."
This paper utilizes a simple yet compelling strategy for identifying CRA's impact.
I take advantage of a discontinuity in CRA's eligibility rule to identify its effect on credit
flow in targeted neighborhoods. CRA targets census tracts with a median family income
less than 80% of its MSA's median family income, hereafter "low and moderate income"
(LMI) tracts. This rule provides the basis for a regression discontinuity (RD) design
where the essential idea is that tracts just below and above the cutoff are identical except
for CRA-eligibility and so a substantive difference in lending across the two groups can
be attributed to CRA. Given the considerable transformation of financial markets over
See Haurin et al (2003) for a review of the economics literature, and Kubrin and Squires for an example
from the sociology literature
2 See Li (2005) for an overview of these trends and potential causes.
the past two decades, the importance of exploiting this discontinuity to identify CRA's
effects cannot be overemphasized.
Policy makers have recently debated CRA fiercely (Golberg 2000, Chen 2004)
and it will likely re-emerge as policy makers rethink mortgage market regulations and
policies to avoid future crises (e.g. Bowyer 2008). This paper informs this debate not
only by providing estimates of CRA's effect on bank (regulated) lending, but also its
indirect effect on non-bank (unregulated) lending. While CRA may spark increased bank
lending, crowd-out of non-banks could negate these benefits. On the other hand, non-
bank lending could increase if targeted neighborhoods improve or information spillovers
exist (e.g. Lang and Nakamura 1993), a frequently cited rationale for government
intervention in credit markets (Lacker 1995).
More broadly, studying CRA may yield insights into the costs and benefits of
expanding credit supply. For example, CRA could provide an experimental framework
to study the impact of credit access on crime (e.g. Garmaise and Moskowitz 2006). And
measuring the performance and profitability of marginal CRA mortgages could improve
our understanding of the sustainability of increased lending and homeownership, and as a
result also provide evidence on the competitiveness of the banking industry, a key
regulatory issue as this industry consolidates.
To implement the analysis, I use comprehensive mortgage application data
collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). For all MSA's between
1994 and 2002, I find that bank mortgage origination volume was 3% higher in LMI
tracts at the cutoff. Further analysis reveals that CRA's impact is concentrated entirely in
large MSA's, where enforcement is more intense. In this subsample, the discontinuity in
bank lending grows from 4% between 1994 and 1996 to 8% between 1997 and 2002,
consistent with a reform implemented by 1997 strengthening CRA.4 Notably, this reform
added incentives for banks to target LMI households and in a companion paper using a
similar RD strategy (Bhutta 2008a) I find that CRA's effect on this margin is also
concentrated in large MSA's.
For non-banks, I find evidence of "crowd-in". In large MSAs in post-reform
years, I find non-bank lending increased by 3%. Further, the increase in credit by
unregulated lenders is concentrated in tracts that have had relatively low previous home
sales, while the discontinuity in bank lending occurs in both low and high sales tracts.
These results are consistent with a model of information externalities inhibiting credit
flow in thin markets (see Section 3).
It is important to note that these results are sensitive to controlling for MSA and
tract size. However, conditional on MSA and tract size, other covariates that explain an
additional 20-25% of the variation in loan volume are very well-balanced across the
cutoff, making a strong case for a causal interpretation of the results. Also important to
this interpretation, the RD strategy does not readily identify discontinuities at non-CRA
points.
Finally, I take advantage of the change in LMI status of some tracts following the
release of 2000 Census data by formulating a "two-dimensional" regression discontinuity
design - the change in treatment status depends on two variables instead of one - to
assess the effects of CRA in 2004 and 2005. While summary statistics reveal
3 Caplin and Leahy (1998) develop a similar model in the context of retail development in New York City.
4 Zinman (2002) uses this reform to help identify his study of CRA's effect on small business lending.
extraordinary growth in loan volume in "switching" tracts, indicative of the explosion in
credit supply at this time, the RD strategy identifies a modest effect of CRA on bank
lending of 4-5% to these tracts. As this finding is for a set of newly targeted census
tracts, it strengthens the causal interpretation of the earlier results.
In the next section, I discuss CRA in more detail and review previous research
trying to identify CRA's effect on credit supply. Section 3 describes CRA's potential
effects, including a short discussion of the information externality model. Section 4
discusses the data and regression discontinuity strategy. Section 5 presents the results
and discusses the "two-dimensional" regression discontinuity approach, and Section 6
concludes.
1.2. Background & Related Literature
Congress passed the CRA in response to claims that banks were continuing to
irrationally redline low-income, urban neighborhoods. 5 To ensure that banks and thrifts
(hereafter banks) supply credit in both high and low income neighborhoods within their
operating market, regulators periodically inspect their lending records. Importantly, CRA
does not cover non-deposit independent mortgage companies or credit unions. And,
CRA does not automatically cover non-deposit mortgage subsidiaries of banks, but banks
have the option of including their subsidiaries' lending in their CRA evaluation.
Examiners rate banks in each of their "assessment area(s)" - generally the MSAs
and/or counties where they have branches - separately and then combine these ratings
into an overall grade (e.g. outstanding, needs to improve, etc.). 6  For multi-MSA
institutions, examiners pay close attention to the largest markets they serve (see
discussion in Section 5.2). Regulators can then penalize banks earning a poor CRA
rating by denying applications for bank mergers, opening and closing new branches and
other activities.
Interest in CRA as a tool to help expand homeownership opportunities grew in the
late 1980's and early 1990's. Lawmakers pushed regulators to improve enforcement,
beginning with an 1989 amendment forcing regulators to publicly disclose CRA
evaluations and culminating in a 1995 reform (phased in by mid-1997) that shifted
examiners' focus towards banks' actual record of lending rather than procedural efforts to
meet CRA, such as spending time meeting with community groups. 7' 8 A strengthened
CRA combined with accelerating bank merger activity following bank deregulation may
have made CRA more effective during the late 1990's.
Community organizations also play a role in enforcement. Regulators must solicit
and weigh public comments on a bank before deciding on its merger application.
Community groups can and often do use the HMDA data and other resources to build a
5 FHA underwriting manuals through the 1950's explicitly warned lenders against lending in minority
neighborhoods (see Jackson (1985). Gotham (2000) cites examples of continued discriminatory language
in private underwriting and appraisal manuals through the 1970's.
6 Banks define their assessment area for CRA evaluations.
7 Banks with an exam scheduled between January 1, 1996 and June 30, 1997 had the option of being
evaluated under the old CRA criteria. Most took that option suggesting the new standards were more
rigorous (Thomas 1998).
8 See Barr (2005) and Fishbein (1992) for enforcement and legislative history of CRA.
case against a bank. 9 In response, banks have entered into "CRA Agreements" with
community groups where banks pledge resources to targeted neighborhoods. Consistent
with CRA becoming more salient for banks during the 1990's, the value of new CRA
agreements rose considerably at this time (Figure 1). And bankers interviewed by
Harvard's Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS) said that many banks have taken
considerable steps to increase CRA-qualified loans to avoid CRA-associated difficulties
and bad press (Belsky et al 2000).
A major component of the CRA evaluation is a bank's volume of lending to LMI
neighborhoods compared to that of its peers as well as to the bank's non-LMI lending
volume. Regulators therefore give banks "CRA-credit" as a discontinuous function of
tract income. Therefore, to identify CRA's effect, I will measure the jump in loan
volume at the point where CRA-credit jumps.
This strategy differs from most other studies of CRA. A few studies test for bank-
specific reactions to particular CRA incentives, with mixed results. Dahl et al (2002)
show that changes in CRA-type lending is uncorrelated with CRA rating downgrades in
the early 1990's. In contrast, Bostic and Robinson (2005) find that banks increase
targeted lending during the years in which they have a CRA agreement in effect, and
Bostic et al (2005) find that merging banks' CRA-qualified lending increases prior to
acquisitions of other banks.
Other studies, as this one, try to estimate CRA's impact more broadly. JCHS
researchers (2002) show that banks make a higher fraction of their loans to and are less
likely to deny loan applications from CRA-targeted populations inside the bank's
assessment area (i.e. where banks get "CRA credit") compared to outside those
geographic boundaries. But because bank operations likely differ in areas where they
have branches relative to where they do not - for instance, better knowledge of the local
market and population which may allow more lending to low-income borrowers - this
test lacks a causal interpretation.' 0
A few studies (Schill and Wachter 1994, Evanoff and Segal 1996, Bostic and
Surette 2004) find that unregulated LMI loan growth exceeds that of regulated lenders,
implying CRA's effect has been limited. But excessive unregulated loan growth suggests
that the trend in unregulated lending is not likely to provide a valid counterfactual to test
CRA's effect on bank behavior, perhaps because unregulated lending operates under a
different business model. Another concern is that reductions in underreporting during the
1990's likely inflate loan growth for independent mortgage companies more so than for
banks (JCHS 2002, Bhutta 2008a).
Similar to the current paper's strategy, Berry and Lee (2007) exploit the CRA
discontinuity, but they test for a discontinuity in loan rejection rates and find no effect.
This test assumes that banks respond to CRA by lowering credit standards, which may
not be the case (see Section 3). Even if banks do lower credit standards, testing for a
discontinuity in the denial rate will be biased if average applicant credit quality changes
in response. For instance, more high-risk types might apply as the probability of
9 For instance, protest of a merger application by WesBanco in 2001 resulted in a year long delay (NCRC
2002).
10 They also exploit variation across MSA's in CRA Agreements. As the authors acknowledge, this
strategy also does not have a causal interpretation since MSA's where banks sign into agreements are likely
to be different from other MSA's and CRA agreements locations may be endogenous.
acceptance rises. Indeed, Canner et al (1999) shows that during the 1990's, the
expansion of subprime credit led to an increase in credit supply and denial rates. Both in
this paper and in Bhutta (2008a) mentioned earlier, I detect a jump in application volume
at the CRA cutoff, calling into question Berry and Lee's assumptions. Aside from this
concern, the current study is also more comprehensive in that I look at CRA's effect on
several loan types and dollars lent, and evaluate CRA's indirect effects on non-banks.
1.3. Neighborhood Credit Supply and the CRA"
Two types of lenders generally supply mortgage credit: banks, which take
deposits, and mortgage companies (non-banks) that get loanable funds from a secondary
market of investors. Roughly, banks serve prime (low-risk) borrowers, while non-banks
provide FHA (government insured) and subprime loans in addition to conventional prime
loans (Nichols et al 2005). The availability of prime, FHA and subprime mortgages
suggests that a variety of risk types can obtain credit (Pennington-Cross et al 2000). Still,
a large fraction of applications are denied indicating that many may have difficulty
obtaining a mortgage.
The effect of CRA on targeted-neighborhood credit supply depends on how banks
respond to CRA. Banks may attract applications away from non-banks, for instance
through increased neighborhood advertising or by providing incentives to mortgage
brokers and real estate agents to recommend customers to them, leaving credit supply
basically unchanged.
Alternatively, banks may offer credit at a lower price in targeted areas. Some
crowd-out may occur, but an overall increase in credit flow would result as demand
would rise in response and more borrowers would meet payment-to-income ratio
requirements. This scenario would raise consumer welfare and potentially generate
positive neighborhood externalities as borrowers would be less likely to default (e.g.
Immergluck and Smith 2006).
Banks may also lower their credit standards, which could crowd-out non-banks'
FHA and subprime lending. Otherwise, such marginal loans might have differing effects
over time, at first increasing credit supply and homeownership but subsequently resulting
in more defaults and perhaps destabilizing neighborhoods.
Other research indicates that banks often work with community groups and state
agencies to help provide credit to marginal borrowers (see Avery et al 2000, Campen and
Callahan 2001, Quercia et al 2001). For instance, banks may allow a lower credit score
but would require the borrower to attend a third party's financial literacy course. Banks
might also conduct more thorough credit checks, on their own or with the help of a third
party, allowing them to extend more credit to marginal borrowers.
Increased credit supply due to CRA that generates more home sales and/or
increased homeownership could result in observed increases in non-bank lending. For
instance, as homeownership rises the demand for refinance and home improvement credit
should rise - demand that would likely be met by both banks and non-banks.
Lang and Nakamura (L-N 1993) provide a more subtle reason for "crowd-in".
They hypothesize that increased home sales generates public information about
neighborhood home values that can increase appraisal precision and thus lead to greater
equilibrium credit supply. More concretely, a lender's net value of a loan, V,, at time t is
" This section draws partially on a discussion in Avery et al (2003)
a function of the loan size, L,, appraisal uncertainty, o,, and a vector of other loan
characteristics 0,: V, = V(L,, q,0,). Lenders choose a maximum loan size, L,, given a,
and 0, to maximize value. The implicit derivative of the value-maximizing loan size
with respect to appraisal uncertainty is (-dV/ )/( VK/ L,). This derivative is
negative since both partial derivatives are negative: an increase in either loan size or
appraisal uncertainty, all else equal, reduces lenders' valuation of a loan. Importantly,
asset-value uncertainty negatively affects loan value even for risk neutral lenders because
of the asymmetry in payoffs: there are no gains to lenders from low appraisals to offset
the default losses from high appraisals. Thus, lenders reduce offered loan size to
counterbalance higher appraisal uncertainty (or, more generally, restrict credit supply in
some way). Finally, L-N argue that appraisal precision depends on information generated
from previous home sales, but the non-excludability of this information (e.g. real estate
transaction details are made public) diminishes lenders' incentive to lend, leading to
suboptimal credit supply. For instance, a negative shock to neighborhood home sales in
one period may propagate as lenders wait to profit from the information generated by
other lenders' lending activity.
A few studies establish a positive relationship between home sales in one period
and subsequent credit access, but none have a quasi-experimental setup. 12 This study
may provide evidence of the L-N hypothesis by taking advantage of the shock to home
sales induced by CRA, combined with data on historical tract-level sales volume. If the
L-N hypothesis is true, then an increase in bank home purchase loans due to CRA should
have a greater effect on non-bank home purchase lending in previously low-sales areas
than in high-sales areas. More precisely, the discontinuity in non-bank lending at the
CRA cutoff amongst low-sales tracts should exceed that for high-sales tracts.
1.4. Data & Empirical Strategy
1.4.1. Overview
I take advantage of a sharp discontinuity in the CRA eligibility rule to identify its
impact on credit flow. Census tracts with a median family income less than 80% of MSA
median family income qualify as "low-and-moderate" income (LMI) under CRA
regulatory procedures and are targeted by banks. In the regression discontinuity (RD)
analysis that follows, this income ratio (TM) is the "assignment" (or "running") variable.
The impact of the CRA at the cutoff will be identified by measuring the jump in loan
volume at TM= 0.80.
Importantly, the value of TM used in this paper is identical to that used by bank
regulators. As such, the key right-hand-side variable in the regressions to follow is
measured precisely. Tract and MSA median family income are based on decennial
Census income data and MSA definitions, which change periodically. Between 1994 and
2002 almost all census tracts had a constant value of TM based on the 1990 Census and
1993 MSA definitions (by OMB).' 3 In 2003, 2000 Census data was used to calculate
12 See Blackburn and Vermilyea (2006), Harrison (2001), Ling and Wachter (1998) and Calem (1996).
Also, Calem and Wachter 1999, LaCour-Little and Malpezzi 2003, Capozza et al 2005 show a link between
appraisal quality and subsequent default - the intervening mechanism in the L-N model.
13 The exception is tracts that are part of the few newly formed MSAs between 1994 and 2002. I only use
tracts that are in the 1993 set of MSAs.
TM. TM changed again in 2004 as MSA definitions changed considerably (see Section
5.2). I perform two separate analyses - one for 1994 to 2002 and another for 2004-2005.
4.2. Data & Summary Statistics
Data on census tract level mortgage activity comes from information submitted by
lenders under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA 1977). Since 1990, lenders
covered by HMDA have been required to compile and submit detailed information on the
individual mortgage applications they receive. And in 1993 a large number of
independent mortgage companies previously exempt began reporting under HMDA.14
HMDA provides a unique lender ID that I use to separate loans by three lender
types: banks, mortgage subsidiaries of banks and independent mortgage companies.
Credit unions, which extend a very small share of mortgage credit, are included in this
last group because they also fall outside the reach of CRA. I also use the census tract of
the property, the loan amount, the disposition of the loan (e.g. approved, originated,
denied, etc.), the loan purpose (e.g. refinance), and whether the loan was sold in the
secondary market and to whom it was sold. Finally, lenders report some borrower
characteristics such as race, gender, and income, which I use to measure changes in
portfolio risk. See Table 1 for a full list and description of the variables available in
HMDA.
I also use census tract-level characteristics from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses,
compiled and distributed by Geolytics. I merge these characteristics to the HMDA loan
data using the census tract codes to create a tract-level dataset, with yearly mortgage
activity variables from HMDA summed up by tract for different periods.
The analysis focuses on census tracts in MSAs as HMDA data are unreliable in
rural areas (Avery et al 2007). In terms of MSA coverage, I provide evidence in the
follow-up paper using Census and CPS data that HMDA accounts for the vast majority of
home purchase lending activity at least by 1999 and that coverage increased considerably
since 1994. Further, although independent banks in MSAs with less than $30 million in
assets are exempt from reporting, using FDIC Call Report and Summary of Deposit data I
find that these small banks held only 1.6% of the value of all 1-4 family residential loans
held by all banks with at least one branch in an MSA at the end of 1998.
In addition to rural tracts, I exclude census tracts in MSAs in Hawaii and Alaska.
Of the remaining states, I use only census tracts that have been in an MSA since 1994 in
order to maintain a constant set of geographies. Of tracts in eligible MSAs around the
cutoff (0.75 5 TM < 0.85), I use just over 96% in the analysis. I keep census tracts with
at least 100 housing units, at least one "specified" owner-occupied unit, less than 30% of
the population in group quarters, at least one application of any type in each year, and
those with between 0.25 and 20 originations per (1990) owner-occupied unit from 1994
to 2002.
Table 2 provides means of tract-level mortgage activity and tract characteristics
for three groups of tracts: those just below the cutoff (column 2), those just above the
cutoff (column 3), and those with median family income close to that of the MSA
(column 1). Panel A shows average mortgage volume by loan type and the three lender
types between 1994 and 2002. Column 4 provides the p-Value for a test of the equality
of the means in columns 2 and 3.
14 See Avery et al (2007) for more details on HMDA coverage and reliability. Also see FFIEC website
(www.fflec.gov) for rules defining which lending institutions are required to report under HMDA.
Table 2 makes clear that loan volume is highly correlated with tract relative
income. Summing all loans by all lenders, total loan volume for median income tracts is
around 30% higher than for the CRA-ineligible group and more than 60% higher than the
CRA-eligible group. The differences in terms of owner-occupied housing units are 18%
and 39%, respectively. In fact, substantive differences across the cutoff occur for nearly
all the housing and demographic variables in panel B. The regression discontinuity
strategy discussed next provides a reliable way in theory to deal with the apparent
selection problem when trying to identify the impact of CRA.
1.4.3. Regression Discontinuity
Consider the following tract-level regression of potential outcomes (e.g. log total
originations by banks between 1994 and 2002) on a CRA treatment indicator variable, Di
= 1[TM, < 0.80]:
(1.1) = a+ )fD, +e,
The essential premise of the regression discontinuity design is that:
(1.2) lim {E[ei 10.80 - h < TM, < 0.80]- E[e , 0.80 5 TM, 1  0.80 + h]} = 0h-+O
In words, CRA targeted and not-targeted tracts arbitrarily close to the cutoff (TM = 0.80)
are identical in expectation with the exception of their eligibility status. As such, any
substantive difference in outcomes across the cutoff for tracts "near" the cutoff can be
attributed to a CRA treatment effect. Crucially, under assumption (1.2) the major
changes in mortgage markets over the study period and the substantial differences
between LMI and non-LMI census tracts do not threaten identification of CRA's effect at
the tract-eligibility threshold.
One approach to estimating fl is to compare the outcome mean for tracts "just
below" the cutoff to that for tracts "just above" the cutoff. But because loan volume is
highly correlated with the assignment variable, as illustrated in Table 2, a more attractive
strategy is to model the underlying relationship between loan volume and TM in the
vicinity of the cutoff, and fl will be measured as the difference in the right and left limits
of this function at the cutoff (Imbens and Lemieux 2007).
To see this, rewrite (1.1) as
(1.3) E[Yf I D, TM,] =  D, + E[e, I D,,TM,]
And since D is determined entirely by TM (1.3) becomes
(1.4) E[Y I TM,] = P#D, + E[e, I TM,]
And finally, the RD estimating equation is given by
(1.5) Y, = PD, + E[e, I TM,] + /
where u, = Y, - E[Y, TM,]. E[e
, 
I TM,] is the "control function" - it controls for the
expected value of all excluded variables that affect y and are correlated with D. It will be
approximated by linear and polynomial functions of TM.
1.5. Results
1.5.1. Testing the Identification Assumption
If observable, "pre-treatment" tract characteristics change smoothly across the
cutoff, that would lend credence to the identification assumption that all tract
characteristics affecting lending, except for CRA-eligibility status, change smoothly
across the cutoff. Figure 2 displays a test of the identification assumption. It plots the
predicted values from a regression of the (log) total number of originations (all lenders
and loan types) between 1994 and 2002 for tracts with TM between 0.75 and 0.85 on the
set of 1990 tract characteristics listed in Panel B of Table 2.15 Each data point shown in
Figure 2 represents the mean of the predicted values for tracts in a half-percentage point
interval of TM. Also shown is an estimated regression line fit to the underlying tract-
level predicted values that allows for an intercept shift at the cutoff. Importantly, the set
of tract characteristics used explains more than 75% of the variation in tract loan volume
and so this test is quite informative about loan volume around the cutoff in the absence of
CRA.
A few features stand out. One is the steep slope of the data, reflecting the quick
change in tract characteristics over TM around the cutoff. Second, the pattern of the data
suggests that the ex-ante relationship between loan volume and TM around the cutoff is
approximately linear. Finally, the data do not indicate any sharp change in tract
characteristics at the cutoff.16 There does appear to be considerable variation in tract
characteristics just to the left of the cutoff and near TM = 0.75 that may make estimating
CRA's effect more difficult.
1.5.2. RD Estimates of CRA's Effect on Bank Lending
Figure 3, which is analogous to Figure 2 except that the Y-axis variable is (log)
total bank originations, mirrors the patterns observed in Figure 2. However, the data to
the left of the cutoff have shifted up relative to the data for the control tracts when
compared with Figure 2, suggesting a positive CRA effect. For instance, the first point to
the left of the cutoff is well above the points just to the right, unlike in Figure 2. And the
next two points, while being considerably lower, as they are in Figure 2, appear to lie
along the dashed trend line whereas they fall below the dashed line in Figure 2.
The top left corner of Table 3 shows the regression result corresponding to Figure
3, and indicates a discontinuity estimate (standard error) in bank loan volume of nearly
7% (5%). The variance estimates throughout the paper allow for within-MSA spatial
correlation. Column 2 shows estimates after including MSA fixed effects. The R2
increases substantially and the standard error falls by about 25%, but the point estimate is
also cut nearly in half, implying that the MSA composition of tracts is not well-balanced
across the cutoff. Columns 3 and 4 add in tract-level controls, helping bring down the
I5 log-transform the number of owner-occupied units, total number of housing units and median home
value before entering them into the regression.
16 The point estimate of the discontinuity in predicted loan volume is nearly 2% and is not statistically
significant.
standard error substantially. At the same time, the point estimates across these columns
are stable suggesting that within MSA tracts are comparable across the cutoff.
Columns 5 thru 7 use larger bandwidths to help estimate the control function
more precisely. The power gained by using more data will be offset to some degree by
using a higher order polynomial control function. In addition, to account for a potential
discontinuity in loan volume due to the GSE Act, I allow for an intercept shift at TM =
0.90.17 The estimates in Columns 5 thru 7 are relatively precise - all are significant at the
5% level. The point estimates range from 2.7% (Column 6) to 3.8% (Column 3). This
stability suggests that the conditional relationship between loan volume and TM around
the cutoff is well-behaved.
Panels B, C and D show RD estimates separately for census tracts grouped by
three MSA size classes. Although CRA applies to all MSAs, enforcement is likely to be
greater in large cities for several reasons. First, while large, multi-MSA banks dominate
the credit and banking markets in cities of all sizes 18, regulators tend to focus on these
banks' activity in the largest cities to help conserve regulatory resources. 19
In addition, community groups that may challenge bank applications and
negotiate CRA agreements are active mainly in large cities. Indeed, an historical list of
CRA agreements provided by the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC
2005) suggests that large cities such as Boston, Washington DC, New York City, Detroit,
and Philadelphia have commanded a large proportion of bank commitments.20
Finally, the higher probability of public scrutiny in large cities may affect the
response to CRA of relatively small banks operating in large cities. First, because smaller
banks generally operate in a single market, negative publicity in their sole market could
be quite harmful. And secondly, smaller banks may hope to position themselves as
acquisition targets 21, and they might be relatively more attractive if a potential buyer can
be sure regulators will not place costly delays or conditions on the application because of
negative public comments.
Panels B and C show results for census tracts in small (1990 population less than
500,000) and medium (1990 population between 500,000 and 2 million) MSAs,
respectively. After controlling for both MSA and tract size (log number of housing units
in 1990) the point estimates in Column 3 show no discontinuity in loan volume, although
the standard errors are large (5.6% and 4.1%). Including all the other covariates does not
affect the point estimates substantively, and subsequently increasing the bandwidth again
"7 The GSE Act of 1992 mandates that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac make a certain proportion of their
mortgage purchases of loans in neighborhoods with TM < 0.90. See Bhutta (2008b) for an evaluation of its
impact.
1S For instance, I find that in 1997, banks with more than $5 billion in assets (less than 3% of banks)
originated nearly 40% of all HMDA-reported single family loans and controlled close to 45% of deposits in
MSAs with a (1990) population of less than 1 million. At the same time, the median bank in this size class
had branches in 7 different MSAs and had more than 70% of its total deposits coming from MSAs with
more than 1 million people.
~9 See Goldberg (2000). The guidelines for evaluating multi-MSA banks instruct regulators to consider the
size of an MSA when choosing which of a bank's set of markets to do a "full-scope" review
(www.ffiec.gov).
20 Also see Shwartz (1998)
21 One reason banks may hope to be acquired is because of possible increases in shareholder wealth due to
the acquisition (Cornett and De 1991, Carow and Kane 2001)
increases precision. Overall, there is little evidence of a CRA effect on bank lending in
both small and medium size MSAs.
Panel D indicates that CRA's effect is concentrated in the largest MSAs - those
with at least 2 million people (in 1990), of which there are 23 (out of 321 MSAs in the
sample) accounting for nearly 40% of census tracts. Columns 3 thru 7 indicates a
discontinuity in bank lending of more than 7% with last three estimates have p-Values
under 0.01. However, the estimates are again sensitive to MSA and tract size controls,
which is troubling in terms of satisfying the RD identifying assumption. But the
robustness of the point estimate to additional controls that explain a considerable amount
loan volume variation (e.g. the R2 increases by more than 25% from Columns 3 to 4 in
Panel D) makes a strong case for a causal interpretation of the estimates in Columns 3
thru 7.
Figure 4 provides results of a falsification exercise where I test for discontinuities
in large MSA bank lending at non-CRA cutoffs - i.e. points where there should not be a
discontinuity. 22 Each point in Figure 4 represents the estimated discontinuity at the given
value of TM using the Column 5 specification of Table 3. Nearly all of the estimates
away from the CRA cutoff fall close to the zero line, indicating that discontinuities in the
data are not easily generated. These results also reinforce the causal interpretation of the
discontinuity at 0.80.
A discontinuity does appear at TM = 0.75. In testing more than twenty points, it
is not surprising to find one statistically significant discontinuity. Probing deeper, I find
that pre-existing tract characteristics change rapidly around 0.75. Performing an analysis
similar to that in Figure 2, I find a discontinuity in predicted loan volume at TM = 0.75,
conditional on tract size and MSA, of -8.4% (standard error of 4.3%). In contrast, this
same exercise yields no discontinuity at the CRA cutoff (point estimate of -0.7%).
Table 4 shows separate estimates (using the Column 6 specification in Table 3) of
CRA's effect on different loan types - home purchase loans and refinance/home
improvement loans - and for two different periods that represent years before and after
full implementation of the 1995 CRA reform. As in Table 3, Panel A shows estimates for
loan originations. The point estimate for all loans combined (Columns 1 and 2) is about
twice as large in the second period, consistent with the reform strengthening CRA's
effect. 23 The results also show a relatively large effect after 1997 in both home purchase
lending (8.5%) and refinance/home improvement lending (8.1%).
Panel B shows estimates for CRA's effect on the number of loan applications to
banks. As argued earlier, applications may react to CRA if banks, for instance, increase
their advertising in targeted neighborhoods or borrowers perceive their chances of
obtaining a loan to be greater. Indeed, Table 4 indicates that applications for both loan
types do rise in response to CRA. Finally, Panel C shows estimates for the discontinuity
in dollars lent. While the point estimates in Panels A and C suggest that home purchase
lending rises by a similar proportion in both number and value, the point estimate at the
bottom of Column 4 is somewhat lower than the rise in refinance/home improvement
originations (0.081 versus 0.057). This result coincides with anecdotal evidence that
22 One exception is that the GSE Act may induce a discontinuity in lending at TM = 90.23 The standard error of the difference is about 0.027 - not quite statistically significant.
community groups push banks to increase the supply of small loans to help provide
liquidity to homeowners (NCRC 2005). 24
1.5.3. Risk Characteristics of Marginal Loans
An ideal way to discern the risk of marginal loans would be to look at how the
distribution of borrower credit scores changes across the CRA cutoff. Unfortunately,
borrower credit score is not available in HMDA. Instead, I create a risk measure by using
the available loan and borrower characteristics along with application outcomes (e.g.
application denied by lender) to predict each application's probability of being denied
given those characteristics. Of course, predicted denial probabilities will reflect
underlying risk as well as other factors. For instance, high denial rates for minorities
could reflect both lower average credit scores as well as lender discrimination.
To estimate the risk of an application, I first run the following regression:
(5.1) denyjMt = a + X jMM + AM, + EjMt
where denyjMt is an indicator variable equal to one if applicationj in MSA M and year t
was denied, x is a vector of loan and borrower characteristics, A is a set of MSA by year
fixed effects and the coefficients on x are allowed to vary by MSA and year. (5.1) is run
using home purchase applications at banks between 1997 and 2002 with TM between
0.50 and 1.10 and for which a credit decision was made. 25 In this sample, about 18% of
applications were denied.
Using the estimated coefficients I generate predicted values and then I identify
each application's quintile within its MSA-by-year (predicted) distribution. The
predicted values are informative: applications predicted to be in the lowest risk (bottom
quintile) have a 15% denial rate while applications predicted to be the highest risk (top
quintile) have a 50% denial rate.
The gray bars in Figure 5 show the share of home purchase originations to each of
the five risk groups as well as to investors (non-owner-occupiers) in tracts just above the
CRA cutoff (0.80 < TM < 0.82). The modal owner-occupying borrower in these tracts is
in the middle risk quintile.26 The black bars provide estimates of the effect of CRA on
the risk distribution from discontinuity regressions as in Table 4, except the outcome
variable is the share of home purchase originations to a particular risk group (i.e. I run six
regressions). The difference between the black and grey bars represents the estimated
discontinuity in loan share.
24 Small home improvement loans may relatively expensive because of fixed costs associated with any loan
contract (see Cleary and Zimmerman 2006). Martin-Guerrero (2002) finds that a large proportion home
improvement projects are funded by savings, tax refunds and/or family gifts, consistent with home
improvement credit being costly.
25 I don't include applications withdrawn before the lender's decision was made. I also drop farm loans and
loans with missing or zero loan amounts. I use only home purchase applications because borrower
characteristics are more reliably reported compared to refinance and home improvement loans. The
variables in x are a set of dummy variables for borrower income (12 groups), amount-to-income ratio (10
groups), race (5 groups) and applicant/co-applicant gender (5 groups; e.g. male/female, male only, etc.).
26 The distribution in relatively high-income tracts is skewed toward low-risk borrowers and vice versa (not
shown).
Figure 5 provides very little evidence for a increase in portfolio risk at the cutoff.
Without a better set of risk indicators (e.g. credit score, employment history, etc.) it may
be difficult to detect more subtle changes in risk across the cutoff. Another point to keep
in mind is that while marginal CRA loans may be going to typical borrowers, the typical
bank borrower in tracts near the cutoff is relatively low-income - the median borrower's
income is about 85% of the MSA median family income - and has a relatively high
likelihood of denial - the denial rate around the cutoff is just over 20%.
1.5.3. RD Estimates of CRA 's Effect on Non-Bank Lending
The results thus far show that banks have expanded their credit supply - both for
home purchase and refinance/home improvement - in CRA-targeted areas. Also, they
are getting more applications but do not appear to take on more risk. As mentioned
earlier, these results may reflect banks attracting applications away from non-banks.
Crowd-out seems especially likely in the case of increased home purchase lending since
an underlying good (i.e. a house) must be supplied. I next test for whether bank lending
substitutes for or compliments non-bank lending.
Table 5 provides estimates of CRA's effect for independent mortgage companies
(IMC) and mortgage bank subsidiaries (BMC) separately. The positive discontinuity in
BMC lending (Columns 3 and 4) is difficult to interpret because CRA may affect these
lenders directly (see Sections 2). Nevertheless, this result rejects the concern some have
raised of banks obtaining CRA loans from their subsidiaries to improve their CRA grade
(e.g. Marsico 2006).
The results for IMCs (Columns 1 and 2) suggest that CRA generated an
equilibrium with greater lending. In post-reform years, IMC lending is 3% higher at the
cutoff. Importantly, there is no pre-existing discontinuity in non-bank lending - the IMC
point estimate for 1994-1996 is 0.006. Also, the modest discontinuity in originations
after 1997 does not appear to be driven by any single year. When I divide the 1997-2002
period into two sub-periods (1997-1999 and 2000-2002), I find a discontinuity in
originations of similar magnitude in both sub-periods (the point estimates are 0.032 and
0.033, respectively; both are significant at the 10% level).
As discussed in Section 3, if the L-N hypothesis is true, then the increase in bank
home purchase loans due to CRA would have a greater subsequent effect on non-bank
lending in areas with relatively few past home sales. To test this hypothesis, I divide
large MSA census tracts into two groups based on tract home purchase loan volume by
all lenders in 1993 and 1994 per (1990) owner-occupied unit. I define a "low-sales"
(high-sales) group of tracts as those with a home purchase loan rate below (above) the
median in their MSA-by-income cell, where tract income takes three values: low
(50<TM<70), medium (70<TM<90) or high (90<TM<110).
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 show estimates of the discontinuity in bank home
purchase lending in low-sales and high-sales tracts. For both groups of tracts there is a
similar (proportional) effect. Analogous estimates for IMCs (Columns 3 and 4) show a
large discontinuity in home purchase lending in low-sales tracts, but no effect in high-
sales tracts. These results are consistent with predictions of the L-N model.
1.5.4. Exploring Alternative Explanations for Crowd-In
Low-sales and high-sales tracts are different, which may lead to differential
effects of CRA for reasons other than an information externality. For instance, the
population of low-sales tracts around the cutoff (0.78 < TM < 0.82) is 24% African-
American, compared to 13% for high-sales tracts. If minority neighborhoods are better
represented by community groups, CRA's direct effect on banks may be stronger in the
low-sales group. But Table 6 shows that the discontinuity in bank home purchase
lending is similar for both groups, and I also find a similar effect across both groups for
home-improvement/refinance lending.27
Another possibility is a differential effect in bank purchases of loans in the
secondary market, for which banks get "CRA-credit" if the purchase is for a loan
originated in an LMI tract. Interestingly, I find a large discontinuity in bank secondary
market purchases - for 1997 and 2002 in large MSAs, the point estimate is 0.125 with a
standard error of 0.020.28 However, I do not find a difference in that effect across high
and low sales tracts. The difference in the point estimates across the two groups is 0.005.
Along these same lines, I test whether non-banks are more likely to sell their
loans to banks in low-sales LMI neighborhoods.29 Specifically, I test for a discontinuity
in non-banks' share of home purchase loans in low-sales tracts sold to banks. While the
point estimate is positive, it is very small - 0.0035 with a standard error of 0.0024.
Likewise, the discontinuity in home purchase loans sold to banks as a share of all such
loans sold is similar (0.0053).
A final reason that I explore for increased non-bank lending in CRA-targeted
tracts stems from the GSE Act, which establishes funding goals for secondary market
institutions Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (the GSEs). The "Special Affordable Goal"
(SAG) in particular targets census tracts with TM < 0.80, similar to the CRA. However,
the SAG also requires that the purchased loan be to a borrower with income less than
80% of the MSA median family income to count towards the GSEs' goal.
A few considerations suggest that the SAG will not explain the results thus far.
First, I know of no reason that the GSE Act should have a differential effect in large
MSAs. And second, direct tests suggest that the GSE Act's effect on credit supply is
small (Bhutta 2008b). Nevertheless, I test for a confounding GSE effect by measuring
the discontinuity in non-bank home purchase lending in low-sales tracts to borrowers
with income above the SAG limit. The point estimate (standard error) of 0.103 (0.039) is
nearly the same as that in Table 6 (Column 3), suggesting that the SAG is not driving the
earlier results.30
1.5.5. The Effect of CRA on Bank and non-Bank Lending, 2004-2005
In addition to cross-sectional variation in treatment status, TM also varies over
time. After each Census, CRA regulators update each tract's assignment variable value (I
will refer to the new value as TMnew and the old value as TMoid). This change generated a
27 Point estimates (standard errors) for the discontinuity in bank home-improvement/refinance lending are
0.077 (0.039) for low-sales tracts and 0.078 (0.021) for high-sales tracts.
28 Again, I use the Column 6 specification from Table 3 and use the log number of bank loan purchases as
the outcome variable.29 Lenders do not report information on the lender from whom they purchased a loan in HMDA, but lenders
do report information on the type of institution to whom they sell a loan (see Table 1).30 Similar analyses suggest the GSE Act does not affect bank lending either.
set of tracts targeted by CRA beginning in 200431 that were not targeted in prior years
(i.e. TMold > 0.80 and TMnew < 0.80) that can be used to estimate CRA's effect more
recently.32 For a sample of tracts not targeted prior to 2004, consider the following
regression model:
(5.2) AY, = a + AD, + Ae,
where A represents the change across 2004. Equation (5.2) is not identified if unobserved
factors drive both changes in treatment status and changes in mortgage activity (i.e.
unobserved deterioration in neighborhood quality could cause both treatment status and
mortgage activity to change). However, this situation is similar to the previous case,
except that the regressor of interest (AD) is now a deterministic function of two variables
instead of just one: TMnew and TMold. This observation leads to an estimating equation
analogous to (1.5) above:
(5.3) AY = a + fAD, + E[Ae, I TMi,new, TMi,od] + ri
where AD, = 1[TM,,, < 80]. To implement (5.3) I substitute for the third term on the
right-hand-side a flexible function of TMoIdand TMn,:
(5.4) TMold + k (TMe + TMold * TMkew) * 1(k > 0)
where k indexes the polynomial order. The idea of the identification strategy is to
compare the change in lending for tracts that just switched to LMI to those that almost
switched into the treatment group - in other words, a difference-in-difference estimate at
the cutoff. In order to use more data away from the cutoff, I control for the relationship
between the assignment variables and loan growth using (5.4).
Table 7 provides group means of various housing and credit flow variables for
tracts that switched status in 2004 from non-LMI to LMI ("switchers") versus tracts that
remained non-LMI ("non-switchers"). I limit the sample to tracts with TMoId between 80
and 90 because the vast majority of switchers come from this group. While TMod is
similar across the two groups (first row, panel A), their TM,, values indicate two groups
are trending in opposite directions. Other characteristics in panels A and B provide
further evidence of these divergent trends.3 3
The difference between the two numbers in the first row of Panel C provides a
basic difference-in-difference (DD) estimate of CRA's effect - a remarkable 15% despite
31 Tracts' median family income based on the 2000 Census was first used in 2003 for CRA enforcement.
However, MSA definitions changed considerably between 2003 and 2004, altering many tracts' TM again.
I ignore outcomes based on 2003 values of TM since these figures were largely temporary, while TM values
assigned in 2004 were essentially permanent.
32 A basic RD test as described earlier will not work after 2004 because of potentially confounding effects
of earlier CRA enforcement. For instance, control tracts in 2004 may have been treated between 1994 and
2002.
33 I link 2000 census tracts to 1990 census tracts using the Census Tract Relationship File and keep the set
of tracts with minimal boundary changes.
the fact that switching tracts are getting poorer. IMC mortgage growth in switching tracts
also exceeds that in non-switching tracts, again implying crowd-in, assuming the DD
estimate is well-identified.
Table 8 shows estimates of (5.3). Column 1 provides a DD estimate controlling
for MSA and TMold, which lowers the coefficients relative to the baseline DD estimates
calculated from Table 7. Columns 2 thru 6 adopt progressively more flexible control
function specifications and include covariates in columns 4 and 6 (see table notes for list
of covariates). Controlling for TMnew and its interaction with TMod in column 2 reduces
the point estimates substantially.
The estimates in columns 2-6 are stable over the various specifications and
suggest CRA had a marginal effect of nearly 5% on bank lending. As this result is for a
new set of targeted tracts, it bolsters the causal interpretation of the earlier results.
In contrast, Panel B shows that CRA did not affect IMC lending this period. The
absence of crowd-in might be explained by the fact that these tracts have just begun being
targeted by CRA. Earlier, it was found that CRA did not have an effect on non-bank
lending until after 1996. Also, the magnitude of the CRA effect for banks is similar to
what it was in the 1994-1996 period (Table 4), and in these years there is no evidence of
positive spillovers to IMCs (Table 5).
1.6. Summary & Discussion
The CRA is a longstanding and large scale government credit market intervention
to expand credit market access in low and moderate income (LMI) communities. Much
controversy surrounds this regulation because its impact is not well understood. This
paper helps inform this debate by exploiting the fact that CRA targets census tracts below
a known income cutoff to estimate CRA's causal effect on mortgage credit flow to LMI
neighborhoods.
The results indicate that CRA's marginal effect on bank lending is about 3% on
average across all MSAs between 1994 and 2002, but the effect appears to be entirely
concentrated in large MSAs where enforcement is likely to be strongest. Separate
discontinuity estimates for small and medium MSAs suggest no impact of CRA, in
contrast to a 7% discontinuity in large MSAs. I also find, using a modified RD design, a
4-5% increase in bank lending between 2004 and 2005 in large MSA tracts newly
targeted due to the release of 2000 Census data.
Focusing on large MSAs, there is no evidence that increased bank lending
crowds-out unregulated or partially regulated lenders. On the contrary, I find small
increases at the cutoff in lending by banks' mortgage subsidiaries, which may be due
directly to CRA, and by unregulated independent mortgage companies. Consistent with a
theory of information externalities hampering credit flow in thin markets, the increase in
unregulated lending is found only in a subset of census tracts that have had a historically
low rate of home sales.
The estimated discontinuity (standard error) for all loan types by all lenders in
large MSAs between 1994 and 2002 is 5% (1%), translating into a little more than 65
extra loans and about $8 million ($2007) of additional credit per tract at the cutoff 34 A
34 This estimate is generated using the Column 6 specification in Table 3. The point estimate for dollars
lent is similar, but less precise with a standard error of 1.7%. Large MSA tracts just below the cutoff (0.78
notable limitation of the RD design is that it only identifies CRA's impact at the
eligibility cutoff. Without making additional assumptions, the RD results say little about
CRA's effect away from the cutoff. A reasonable assumption may be that the
proportional effect holds for tracts within at least 0.05 of the cutoff. Deflating total credit
flow for the 824 sample large MSA tracts with TM between 0.75 and 0.80 establishes a
lower bound total impact of 53,000 loans at a value of $6.3 billion.
It is unclear whether increased lending by banks in targeted tracks is efficient.
While crowd-in by non-banks points to information externalities generating suboptimal
credit supply, the CRA seems too blunt to be motivated primarily as a response to this
problem. Credit may be undersupplied more generally because of externalities,
inadequate competition in mortgage markets or discrimination. Additional data from
other sources on longer term, tract-level outcomes such as loan performance, crime and
home values could shed light on these issues.
CRA may also be motivated simply along equity lines. In this regard its success
may be clearer, although the possibility exists that CRA encourages banks to engage in
deceptive ("predatory") lending practices that harm CRA's intended beneficiaries or
excessively risky lending leads to neighborhood decline. Again, analysis of other
outcomes as they become available might help us understand more clearly the broader
consequences of CRA. This paper establishes motivation for further analysis and a
strategy for conducting it.
References
Avery, Robert B., Raphael W. Bostic, and Glenn B. Canner. 2000. "CRA Special
Lending Programs" Federal Reserve Bulletin, 86(11): 711-731.
Avery, Robert B., Paul S. Calem, and Glenn B. Canner. 2003. "The Effects of the
Community Reinvestment Act on Local Communities" Proceedings.
Avery, Robert B., Kenneth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B. Canner. 2007. "Opportunities
and Issues in using HMDA Data" Journal ofReal Estate Research, 29(4): 351-380.
Barr, Michael S. 2005. "Credit Where it Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and
its Critics" New York University Law Review, 80(2): 513-652.
Belsky, Eric S., Matthew Lambert, Alexander Von Hoffman, and Nicolas P.
Retsinas. 2000. "Insights into the Practice of Community Reinvestment Act Lending: A
Synthesis of CRA Discussion Groups", Joint Center for Housing Studies Working Paper
CRA00-1.
5 TM< 0.80) averaged about 1400 originations during this period at a total value of $167.6 million.
Deflating these values by 5% yields the level impacts.
Bernanke, Ben S. 2007. "The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New
Challenges." Speech at The Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, DC.
Berry, Christopher R. and Sarah L. Lee. 2007. "The Community Reinvestment Act: A
Regression Discontinuity Analysis" , Harris School Working Paper Series 07.04.
Bhutta, Neil. 2008a. "The Effect of the Community Reinvestment Act on Mortgage
Lending to Low-Income Borrowers" Ph.D. MIT.
------- 2008b. "Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effects of the GSE Act of
1992" Ph.D. MIT.
Bostic, Raphael W. and Breck L. Robinson. 2005. "What Makes Community
Reinvestment Act Agreements Work? A Study of Lender Responses" Housing Policy
Debate, 16(3/4): 513-545.
Bostic, Raphael, Anna Paulson, Hamid Mehran, and Marc Saidenberg. 2005.
"Regulatory Incentives and Consolidation: The Case of Commercial Bank Mergers and
the Community Reinvestment Act" Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, 5(1): 1392-
1392.
Bostic, Raphael and Brian J. Surette. 2004. "Market Forces Or CRA-Induced
Externalities: What Accounts for the Increase in Mortgage Lending to Lower-Income
Communities?" Lusk Center for Real Estate Working Paper No. 2004-1013.
Bowyer, Jerry. 2008. "Don't Blame the Markets" The New York Sun. April 18.
Calem, Paul S. and Susan M. Wachter. 1999. "Community Reinvestment and Credit
Risk: Evidence from an Affordable-Home-Loan Program" Real Estate Economics, 27(1).
Calem, Paul S. 1996. "Mortgage Credit Availability in Low- and Moderate-Income
Minority Neighborhoods: Are Information Externalities Critical?" The Journal of Real
Estate Finance and Economics, 13(1): 71-89.
Campen, James T. and Thomas M. Callahan. 2001. "Boston's Soft Second Program:
Reaching Low-Income and Minority Home Buyers in a Changing Financial-Services
Environment" Proceedings: 363-399.
Canner, Glenn B., Wayne Passmore, and Elizabeth Laderman. 1999. "The Role of
Specialized Lenders in Extending Mortgages to Lower-Income and Minority
Homebuyers" Federal Reserve Bulletin: 709-726.
Caplin, Andrew and John Leahy. 1998. "Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information
Externalities and Search" Economic Journal, 108(446): 60-74.
Capozza, Dennis R., Ryan D. Israelsen, and Thomas A. Thomson. 2005. "Appraisal,
Agency and Atypicality: Evidence from Manufactured Homes" Real Estate Economics,
33(3): 509-537.
Carow, Kenneth A. and Edward J. Kane. 2001. "Event-Study Evidence of the Value
of Relaxing Longstanding Regulatory Restraints on Banks, 1970-2000" , NBER 8594.
Chen, David W. 2004. "U.S. Set to Alter Rules for Banks Lending to Poor" New York
Times. October 20.
Cleary, Yahonnes and Ken Zimmerman. 2006. "House Rich, Pocket Poor and Under
Threat: Home Repair Financing and Homeownership Preservation in New Jersey" , New
Jersey Institute for Social Justice Report.
Dahl, Drew, Douglas D. Evanoff, and Michael F. Spivey. 2002. "Community
Reinvestment Act Enforcement and Changes in Targeted Lending" International
Regional Science Review, 25(3).
Evanoff, Douglas D. and Lewis M. Segal. 1996. "CRA and Fair Lending Regulations:
Resulting Trends in Mortgage Lending" Economic Perspectives: 19-46.
Fishbein, Allen J. 1992. "The Ongoing Experiment with 'Regulation from Below':
Expanded Reporting Requirements for HMDA and CRA" Housing Policy Debate, 3(2):
601-636.
Garmaise, Mark J. and Tobias J. Moskowitz. 2006. "Bank Mergers and Crime: The
Real and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition" Journal of Finance, 61(2): 495-
538.
Goldberg, Deborah B. 2000. "The Community Reinvestment Act and the Modernized
Financial Services World" ABA Bank Compliance, 21(1): 13.
Gotham, K. F. 2000. "Separate and Unequal: The Housing Act of 1968 and the Section
235 Program" Sociological Forum, 15: 13-37.
Guttentag, Jack M. and Susan M. Wachter. 1980. Redlining and Public Policy. New
York: New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Salomon
Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions.
Harrison, David M. 2001. "The Importance of Lender Heterogeneity in Mortgage
Lending" Journal of Urban Economics, 49(2): 285-309.
Haurin, Donald R., Robert D. Dietz, and Bruce A. Weinberg. 2003. "The Impact of
Neighborhood Homeownership Rates: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical
Literature" Journal of Housing Research, 13(2).
Imbens, Guido and Thomas Lemieux. 2007. "Regression Discontinuity Designs: A
Guide to Practice" , NBER 0337.
Immergluck, Dan and Geoff Smith. 2006. "The External Costs of Foreclosure: The
Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values" Housing Policy
Debate, 17(1): 57-79.
Jackson, Kenneth T. 1985. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United
States. New York: Oxford University Press.
Joint Center for Housing Studies. 2002. "The 25th Anniversary of the Community
Reinvestment Act: Access to Capital in an Evolving Financial Services System." Ford
Foundation Sponsored Report.
Kubrin, Charis E. and Gregory D. Squires. "The Impact of Capital on Crime: Does
Access to Home Mortgage Money Reduce Crime Rates?" Paper presented at Annual
Meeting of the Urban Affairs Association, Washington, DC.
Lacker, Jeffrey M. 1995. "Neighborhoods and Banking" Economic Quarterly: 13-38.
LaCour-Little, Michael and Stephen Malpezzi. 2003. "Appraisal Quality and
Residential Mortgage Default: Evidence from Alaska" The Journal of Real Estate
Finance and Economics, 27(2): 211-233.
Lang, William W. and Leonard I. Nakamura. 1993. "A Model of Redlining" Journal
of Urban Economics, 33: 223-234.
Li, Wenli. 2005. "Moving Up: Trends in Homeownership and Mortgage Indebtedness"
Business Review: 26-34.
Ling, David C. and Susan M. Wachter. 1998. "Information Externalities and Home
Mortgage Underwriting" Journal of Urban Economics, 44(3): 317-332.
Litan, Robert E., Noclas P. Retsinas, Eric S. Belsky, and Susan W. Hagg. 2000. "The
Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Modernization: A Baseline Report" , U.S.
Department of the Treasury Report.
Marsico, Richard D. 2006. "The 2004-2005 Amendments to the Community
Reinvestment Act Regulations: For Communities One Step Forward and Three Steps
Back" Clearinghouse Review, 39.
Martin-Guerrero, Alvaro. 2002. "Financing Home Improvement Projects: The use of
Home-Secured Credit", Joint Center for Housing Studies Working Paper N02-1.
Meeker, Larry and Forest Myers. 1995. "Community Reinvestment Act Lending: Is it
Profitable?" Financial Industry Perspectives: 13-35.
Millon Cornett, Marcia and Sankar De. 1991. "Medium of Payment in Corporate
Acquisitions: Evidence from Interstate Bank Mergers" Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, 23(4): 767-76.
National Reinvestment Coalition. 2005. "CRA Commitments: 1977-2005"
------. 2002. "CRA Manual".
Nichols, Joseph, Anthony Pennington-Cross, and Anthony Yezer. 2005. "Borrower
Self-Selection, Underwriting Costs, and Subprime Mortgage Credit Supply" The Journal
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 30(2): 197-219.
Pennington-Cross, Anthony, Anthony Yezer, and Joseph Nichols. 2000. "Credit Risk
and Mortgage Lending: Who Uses Subprime and Why?", Research Institute for Housing
America Working Paper No. 00-03.
Quercia, Roberto G., Michael A. Stegman, Walter R. Davis, and Eric Stein. 2001.
"Community Reinvestment Lending: A Description and Contrast of Loan Products and
their Performance" , Joint Center for Housing Studies Working Paper LIHO-0 1.11.
Schill, Michael H. and Susan M. Wachter. 1994. "Borrower and Neighborhood Racial
and Income Characteristics and Financial Institution Mortgage Application Screening"
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 9(3): 223-239.
Thomas, Kenneth H. 1998. The CRA Handbook. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Zinman, Jonathan. 2002. "The Efficacy and Efficiency of Credit Market Interventions
Evidence from the Community Reinvestment Act", Joint Center for Housing Studies
CRA02-2.
Figure 1
New CRA Agreements
Dollar Value, 1990-2004
o
0-
C0
•o-(0
a, 0
a,
o-
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
Notes: Three-year MA; dollar values adjusted using CPI-U
Source: NCRC
!
Figure 2
Test of Identification Assumption
1990 Tract Characteristics
- Mortgage Originations Predicted by
qeted Tracts
. o
S * - .
GoC)r"
,.--
no
0.850.78 0.80 0.83
rract to MSA Median Family Income Ratio
Notes: Y-axis values are predicted from coefficients on tract characteristics estimated in a
regression of (log) originations between 1994 and 2002 on tract characteristics and MSA fixed
effects. Data points represent mean of predicted values for tracts within 0.5 percentage point
intervals of TM. Fitted lines generated from regression of predicted values on TM and dummy
for CRA cutoff.
0.75
Figure 3:
Discontinuity in Bank Originations, 1994-2002
CRA-Tarcieted Tracts
0
0 0 0
0
0
.75
* -.
-- 0
-- S
S/ * )
0.78 0.80 0.83
Tract to MSA Median Family Income Ratio
0.85
Notes: Each data point represents the mean of the Y-axis variable for tracts in 0.5 percentage
point bins of TM. Lines are fit from a tract-level regression of the Y-axis variable on TM and a
treatment dummy variable.
0
ORLo
I I
Figure 4:
Falsification Exercise: Discontinuity in Bank Lending at Non-CRA Cutoffs
0.90 0.95
Notes: Each point represents an estimated discontinuity from a separate regression using a bandwidth of 0.15
around each point and a cubic control function.
In
r-
w
N
+ U)
W,cu
OI
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85
Tract Med. Fam. Income, % of MSA
I
Figure 5:
Estimated Risk Distribution of Marginal Home Purchase Loans by Banks in Large
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Table 1:
P i 
V i bl 
A ilable 
in HMDA
Dataset 
1994-2005IrMaly ar %a es Ga Tn ,q 19420
Variable
Year
Institution ID
Regulatory Agency ID
Loan Type
Loan Purpose
Property Type
Occupancy
Loan Amount
HOEPA Status
Lien Status
Action Taken
Denial Reason (optional)
Geography
Income
Applicant(s) Ethnicity
Applicant(s) Race
Applicant(s) Sex
Purchaser
Availability Description
all years
all years
all years
all years
all years
2004-2005
all years
all years
2004-2005
2004-2005
all years
all years
all years
all years
2004-2005
all years
all years
all years
Year of mortgage application or purchase
10 Character Lender Identifier
Code indicating OCC, Fed, FDIC, OTS, NCUA (credit unions) or HUD as supervisory agency
Conventional or government insured (e.g. FHA, VA)
Home purchase, refinance, home improvement or multifamily (i.e. 5+ family property)
1-4 Family, manufactured housing or multifamily structure
Owner-occupied or investment property/second home
Dollar amount of loan
Indicator for high-cost loan: APR at consummation exceeds yield for comparable Treasury by more than 8 percentage
points.
Loan secured by first or subordinate lien
Six possibilities: (1) Loan originated, (2) Borrower rejects lender offer (3) Application denied, (4) Application
withdrawn by applicant (5) Application incomplete, (6) Loan purchased by the institution
Institution can provide primary reason(s) for denial (e.g. credit history, insufficient collateral, debt load, etc)
State, county and census tract of property
Gross annual family income, rounded to the nearest thousand dollar
Indicator for being Hispanic/Latino; may not be provided if telephone/internet application. "Hispanic" is a choice under
Race variable in prior years
Race of primary applicant; race of co-applicant if applicable. May not be provided if telephone/internet application
Sex of primary applicant; sex of co-applicant if applicable. May not be provided if telephone/internet application
For loans sold at time of origination, specifies purchaser of loan (e.g. Fannie Mae, commercial bank, etc.)
Table 2:
Census Tract Summary Statistics
Number of Tracts
Banks & Thrifts
Home Purchase Originations
Refinance & Home Improvment Originations
Mortgage Company Subsidiaries
Home Purchase Originations
Refinance & Home Improvment Originations
Independent Mortgage Companies
Home Purchase Originations
Refinance & Home Improvment Originations
Total Housing Units
Owner-Occupied Units
Med Value Own-Occ Units ($2007)
Prop Units Detached
Prop Units Multifamily
Prop Units Mobile/Trailer
Prop Units Built 1980-1989
Prop Units Built 1940-1969
Prop Units Built <1940
Prop non-Hisp Black
Prop Hispanic
Prop of Pop 65+ Years
Prop Living in Group Qtrs
(1)
0.95<TM<1.05
5826
31.2
(29.1)
54.5
(40.0)
27.4
(31.3)
27.3
(26.6)
30.5
(36.5)
34.6
(32.2)
1917.2
(1020.67)
1197.5
(647.16)
160,326.86
(98,084.81)
0.629
(0.235)
0.149
(0.181)
0.067
(0.109)
0.162
(0.157)
0.435
(0.225)
0.178
(0.196)
0.072
(0.152)
0.060
(0.113)
0.133
(0.070)
0.014
(0.031)
(2) (3)
0.70<TM<0.80 0.80_TM<0.90
3932 5297
A. Loans per Tract per Year, 1994-2002
19.0 23.9
(17.4) (21.9)
32.3 40.9
(24.8) (31.3)
16.4 20.9
(17.8) (23.3)
15.1 19.5
(14.1) (18.9)
20.0 25.0
(20.6) (28.1)
22.8 27.5
(19.2) (24.2)
B. Census Tract Characteristics (1990)
1793.2
(999.50)
863.9
(582.07)
127,788.33
(92,812.21)
0.496
(0.269)
0.197
(0.217)
0.069
(0.133)
0.121
(0.130)
0.438
(0.206)
0.264
(0.248)
0.177
(0.265)
0.124
(0.197)
0.137
(0.079)
0.016
(0.036)
1860.9
(960.93)
1016.6
(578.82)
140,115.35
(95,221.16)
0.549
(0.256)
0.175
(0.202)
0.076
(0.126)
0.140
(0.142)
0.444
(0.214)
0.221
(0.225)
0.119
(0.211)
0.087
(0.156)
0.140
(0.074)
0.015
(0.034)
(4)
p-Value
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.04
<0.01
0.41
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.17
0.28
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. p-Value is from test of difference between means in columns 2 and 3, clustered at MSA-
level.
Table 3:
RD Estimates of CRA's Effect on Bank Lending
Dependent Variable: (log) # originations in tract by banks, 1994-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Sample: All MSAs
(mean) 57.8
0.0680
(0.0529)
0.007
4708
0.0312
(0.0388)
0.404
4708
0.0381
(0.0273)
0.673
4708
0.0337*
(0.0187)
0.868
4708
0.0348**
(0.0151)
0.864
13633
0.0267**
(0.0113)
0.877
25445
0.0301**
(0.0131)
0.877
25445
B. Sample: Small MSAs
61.6
-0.0323
(0.0798)
0.011
1266
-0.0637
(0.0779)
0.473
1266
0.0120
(0.0562)
0.748
1266
-0.0045
(0.0348)
0.889
1266
0.0016
(0.0245)
0.873
3716
-0.0048
(0.0189)
0.883
7143
-0.0040
(0.0222)
0.883
7143
C. Sample: Medium MSAs
55.6
0.0837
(0.0717)
0.009
1642
0.0698
(0.0642)
0.289
1642
0.0061
(0.0413)
0.609
1642
0.0114
(0.0299)
0.860
1642
0.0146
(0.0231)
0.853
4796
0.0015
(0.0173)
0.868
8751
0.0030
(0.0203)
0.869
8751
D. Sample: Large MSAs
57.1
0.0782*
(0.0431)
0.684
1800
0.0764**
(0.0274)
0.869
1800
0.0716***
(0.0222)
0.871
5121
Bandwidth
Control Function
MSA Fixed Effects
0.05
linear
0.05
linear
Y
Tract Size Control'
Other Tract Covariates2
0.05
linear
Y
Y
0.05
linear
Y
Y
0.15
cubic
Y
Y
Y
0.30 0.30
cubic quintic
Y Y
Y Y
Notes: Standard errors clustered at MSA-level shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Includes home
purchase, refinance and home improvement originations. (1) log total number of housing units in 1990. (2) See Table 2
for list of covariates and description in text. Regressions in columns 5-7 include variable indicating for TM 5 0.90 to
control for potential effects of the GSE Act. Small MSAs are those with popualation <500k, medium MSAs have
population between 500k and 2 million, and large MSAs are those with population >2 million according to 1990 Census.
Mean of outcome variable (per year) for selected sample in italics and measured using tracts just above cutoff (0.80 5 TM
< 0.82)
1[TM < 0.80]
R-Squared
# Tracts
1[TM < 0.80]
R-Squared
# Tracts
1[TM < 0.80]
R-Squared
# Tracts
1[TM < 0.80]
R-Squared
# Tracts
0.1257
(0.1111)
0.005
1800
0.0506
(0.0630)
0.449
1800
0.0729***
(0.0158)
0.880
9551
0.0778***
(0.0182)
0.880
9551
Table 4:
RD Estimates of CRA's Effect on Bank Lending in Large MSAs, by Loan Type and Period
All Loan Types Home Purchase Loans
(5) (6)
Refinance & Home
Improvement Loans
mean
1[TM < 0.80]
R-Squared
N
mean
1[TM < 0.80]
R-Squared
N
mean ($000's) 2
1994-1996
41.4
0.0424**
(0.0198)
0.856
9548
67.9
0.0319*
(0.0164)
0.860
9551
3,620.77
1997-2002
64.9
0.0821***
(0.0195)
0.865
9551
118.0
0.0633***
(0.0150)
0.870
9551
7,744.20
1994-1996 1997-2002
A. Originations
17.3
0.0430**
(0.0183)
0.770
9518
22.1
0.0845***
(0.0207)
0.785
9547
B. Applications
24.9
0.0213
(0.0174)
0.773
9540
33.4
0.0713***
(0.0172)
0.782
9551
C. Amount Originated
2,056 80 3,202.10
1[TM < 0.80] 0.0436* 0.0699*** 0.0427* 0.0872*** 0.0277 0.0571**
(0.0235) (0.0202) (0.0240) (0.0229) (0.0278) (0.0220)
R-Squared 0.811 0.837 0.763 0.780 0.784 0.853
N 9548 9551 9518 9547 9539 9551
Notes: Standard errors clustered at MSA-level shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include MSA fixed effects, tract
scale variables and covariates (see Table 2 and text for description), and are run using a bandwidth of 0.30 and cubic control function. Regressions also
include variable indicating for TM 5 0.90 to control for potential effects of the GSE Act. (1) Means of outcome variables in levels (per year), calculated
using tracts just above cutoff (0.80 5 TM < 0.82). (2) Adjusted to year 2007 dollars using CPI-U.
1994-1996
24.1
0.0303
(0.0248)
0.851
9539
43.1
0.0327*
(0.0174)
0.866
9550
1,563.97
1997-2002
42.8
0.0812***
(0.0247)
0.875
9551
84.6
0.0585***
(0.0165)
0.883
9551
4,542.10
Table 5:
Net Effect of CRA on Non-Banks in Large MSAs
Independent Mort. Co.
1994-1996 1997-2002
Mortg. Co. Subsidiary
1994-1996 1997-2002
A. Originations
mean
1[TM < 0.80]
R-Squared
N
mean
1[TM < 0.80]
R-Squared
N
mean ($00's) 2
37.9
0.0060
(0.0196)
0.782
9548
71.5
-0.0043
(0.0202)
0.780
9551
63.3
0.0335**
(0.0143)
0.825
9551
18.8
0.0496**
(0.0177)
0.804
9514
B. Applications
142.5
0.0229
(0.0159)
0.821
9551
28.1
0.0500**
(0.0185)
0.811
9536
C. Loan Amount
41,694.33 82,478.17 22,533.33
1[TM < 0.80] -0.0043 0.0376* 0.0556** 0.0381
(0.0257) (0.0182) (0.0229) (0.0238)
R-Squared 0.761 0.791 0.792 0.838
N 9548 9551 9514 9551
Notes: Standard errors clustered at MSA-level shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Includes home purchase, refinance and home improvement originations. All regressions include MSA
fixed effects, tract scale variables and covariates (see Table 2 and text for description), and are run using
a bandwidth of 0.30 and cubic control function. Regressions also include variable indicating for TM <
0.90 to control for potential effects of the GSE Act. (1) Means of outcome variables in levels, calculated
using tracts just above cutoff (0.80 5 TM < 0.82). (2) Adjusted to year 2007 dollars using CPI-U.
53.9
0.0376**
(0.0181)
0.856
9551
87.0
0.0363**
(0.0164)
0.850
9551
78,939.33
Table 6:
Test of the Lang-Nakamura Information Externality Hypothesis
Dependent Variable: (log) # home purchase originations in tract by lender, 1997-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Banks Indep. Mort. Co.
Low-sales High-sales Low-sales High-sales
Census Tracts Census Tracts Census Tracts Census Tracts
mean 19.5 24.8 24.6 32.6
1[TM < 0.80] 0.0876*** 0.0922*** 0.0882** 0.0037
(0.0293) (0.0278) (0.0317) (0.0320)
R-Squared 0.801 0.792 0.770 0.778
N 4759 4788 4762 4785
Notes: Standard errors clustered at MSA-level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include MSA
fixed effects, tract scale variables and covariates (see Table 2 and text for description), and are run using a bandwidth of 0.30
and cubic control function. Regressions also include variable indicating for TM < 0.90 to control for potential effects of the
GSE Act. (1) Means of outcome variables in levels, calculated using tracts just above cutoff (0.80 5 TM < 0.82). Sample
includes only large MSA census tracts. See text (Section 5.3) for details on how low-sales and high-sales samples are created.
Table 7:
Group Means: Tracts that Switched to LMI versus Tracts that Remain non-LMI
Switchers non-Switchers
A. Tract Income Characteristics
TM, 1990
TM, 2000
Med. Fam Inc, 1990
Med. Fam Inc, 2000
B. Tract Housing Characteristics
Owner-Occ Units, 1990
Owner-Occ Units, 2000
Total Housing Units, 1990
Total Housing Units, 2000
Med House Value, 1990
Med House Value, 2000
C. Mortgage Lending by Banks
Change (log) Bank Originations, 2001/02 -
2004/05
Bank Originations, 2001/02
Change (log) Bank Originations, 1998/99 -
2001/02
D. Mortgage Lending by Ind Mort Co
Change (log) IMC Originations, 2001/02 -
2004/05
IMC Originations, 2001/02
Change (log) IMC Originations, 1998/99 -
2001/02
84.47
(0.11)
71.36
(0.63)
$35,028.21
(1053.85)
$41,313.65
(1723.38)
813.55
(104.37)
833.33
(103.46)
1756.06
(82.89)
1812.25
(80.80)
$111,486.50
(16,380.98)
$135,655.60
(17,466.56)
0.3057
(0.060)
118.66
(18.51)
0.2373
0.0564
0.486
(0.062)
115.30
18.83
0.079
(0.053)
p-Value
85.49
(0.12)
91.96
(0.66)
$35,961.18
(1254.41)
$53,035.66
(1839.21)
955.72
(59.32)
1097.99
(83.06)
1708.48
(66.91)
1881.11
(91.60)
$115,514.20
(13,126.07)
$153,274.10
(12,803.15)
0.1555
(0.057)
193.71
(20.34)
0.317
0.0471
< 0.01
< 0.01
< 0.01
< 0.01
< 0.01
0.17
< 0.01
0.02
< 0.01
0.34
0.29
0.67
0.11
< 0.01
< 0.01
0.03
0.381
(0.046)
162.54
20.50
0.180
(0.036)
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at MSA level) in parentheses. Sample comprised of tracts from MSA's with more
than 2 million people in 1990 with TMold between 80 and 90 that experienced at most minor boundary changes
between 1990 and 2000.
Table 8:
Effect of Changing CRA Status on Loan Origination Growth
A. Banks
1 [switch=1] 0.1086***
(0.0216)
R-Squared 0.462
1662
B. Independent Mort Co
1 [switch=1]
R-Squared
Control Function
Specification'
0.0664**
(0.0282)
0.292
1651
k=0
0.0588*
(0.0338)
0.466
1662
-0.0208
(0.0281)
0.302
1651
k=1
0.0385
(0.0251)
0.471
1662
0.0087
(0.0291)
0.305
1651
k=3
Covariates 2  no no no yes no yes
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at MSA-level) in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include MSA fixed effects.
Sample includes tracts with TMold between 80 and 90 and in MSA's with >2 million population. (1) See text (Section 5.5) for details on control function
specification. (2) Covariates include (log) number owner-occ units in 2000, (log) med house value in 2000, (log) total housing units in 1990, change in
(log) median family income from 1990 to 2000 and growth in originations between 1998/99 and 2001/02.
0.0473**
(0.0205)
0.570
1660
0.0031
(0.0223)
0.411
1645
k=3
0.0476*
(0.0251)
0.472
1662
0.0205
(0.0237)
0.306
1651
k=4
0.0450*
(0.0223)
0.570
1660
0.0018
(0.0193)
0.411
1645
k=4

Chapter 2
The Effect of the Community Reinvestment Act
on Mortgage Lending to Low-Income Borrowers
2.1. Introduction
Between 1994 and 2005 the U.S. homeownership rate grew by about 8% (see
Figure 1), representing an expansion in homeownership not seen since the 1950's. This
sharp change in the rate of growth in homeownership coincided with distinct changes in
the operation of financial markets. Innovation is one aspect of these changes.
Information technology improved sharply in the mid 1990's (e.g. automated underwriting
and use of credit scoring), reducing the cost of mortgage lending and improving the
ability of mortgage lenders to price risk (see Straka 2000). Perhaps as an offshoot of
such advancements lenders also expanded the menu of mortgage contracts, providing
potential borrowers with a greater range of options to finance the purchase of a home (see
Garriga et al 2006). Indeed, the subprime market grew tremendously during this period,
moving the mortgage market closer to one based on price rationing where more of those
with sub-par credit histories can still obtain mortgage credit (see Chomsisengphet and
Pennington-Cross 2006).
At the same time, a number of regulatory changes and public policies aimed at
ensuring equal access to credit and increasing homeownership, especially among
minority and low-income households, were initiated or strengthened in the 1990's. For
instance, the "Government-Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) Act" of 1992 established
mortgage purchasing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac targeted at low income
households and communities (see Bhutta 2008b). Regulators and policy makers also
increased enforcement of and strengthened fair lending laws between the late 1980's and
mid 1990's. Congress expanded The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA 1975),
which requires lenders to disclose details on mortgage applications they receive, in 1989
and 1993 to cover more lenders and to force lenders to disclose more information that
could help regulators identify discriminatory behavior. And the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA 1977), which requires federally-insured deposit institutions to
help meet the credit needs of low-income communities and households, became more
strictly enforced in the early 1990's and then was expanded under the Clinton
Administration in 1995.
All of these changes may have helped expand access to mortgage credit and push
up the homeownership rate among lower income households. Indeed, Figure 2 shows
that since 1994 homeownership rates of relatively low-income households have grown
considerably faster than high-income households. At the same time, a "fixed-coefficient"
analysis shown in Figure 3 suggests that neither demographic changes nor income growth
during the 1990's explain the trend in homeownership. 1 One alternative story is that
sharp increases in credit access for historically marginal groups may have helped raise
homeownership rates. 2
In this paper, I test whether the CRA has had a causal impact on mortgage lending
to low-income households. CRA has recently been at the forefront of contentious policy
debates (Goldberg 2000, Chen 2004), and may very well come up again as policy makers
try to understand the current mortgage market problems (e.g. Bowyer 2008). However,
CRA's effects are not well-understood, confounded by the coincident changes in the
mortgage market discussed. Indeed, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2007)
recently declared, "Distinguishing with certainty the effects that the CRA had on 'CRA-
type' activity from the effects of simultaneous regulatory and market changes over this
period has not been possible."
I make progress on this question by exploiting a discontinuity in CRA's selection
rule to gain traction. In particular, since mid-1997 regulators have assessed banks'
compliance with CRA based in part on their volume of lending to borrowers with income
below 80% of their MSA's median family income (referred to as "low and moderate
income", or LMI). This classification of loans as a sharp, discontinuous function of
borrower income serves as the basis of a regression discontinuity design to identify
CRA's impact where I essentially compare the volume of originations and applications
on either side of this cutoff. More precisely, I employ local nonparametric and semi-
parametric regression discontinuity methods similar to those described in Imbens and
Lemieux (2008) and implemented in Ludwig and Miller's study of Head Start (2007).
The primary result of this analysis is that CRA's impact on bank lending to LMI
borrowers on average across all MSA's between 1998 and 2005 is no larger than 3%. I
do find, however, a substantive discontinuity of about 6% in bank loan activity
(originations, applications and dollars lent) at the cutoff in the largest MSA's, where
enforcement is most intense, during the five years from 1998 to 2002. For a number of
reasons described below, including regulatory changes implemented in 2004 and 2005,
CRA's effect could have declined in recent years. Notably, these results are similar to
the findings in Bhutta (2008a) that also uses a regression discontinuity strategy to
estimate CRA's impact on lending to low-income neighborhoods. In that paper, I also
find that CRA's impact is heavily concentrated in large MSAs.
Interpreting the discontinuity for large MSA's as the causal effect of CRA is
bolstered by the lack of a discontinuity for lenders that are not regulated under CRA (i.e.
independent mortgage companies). The finding is also robust across alternative
bandwidths and specifications of the control function. Further, I find that the relationship
between loan volume and the assignment variable is otherwise smooth - that is, I do not
find discontinuities at points away from the cutoff, suggesting that the one found at the
cutoff is not spurious. Finally, one concern from an interpretive standpoint is whether
banks might simply round down the income of borrowers just above the threshold in
order to obtain CRA credit. But if banks are actually extending credit to new borrowers,
then other loan characteristics might be different across the cutoff. One result that
suggests loan characteristics below the cutoff are changing is that the proportion of loans
'This finding is similar to Doms and Krainer (2007).
2 Quercia et al 2003, Gabriel and Rosenthal 2003, Doms and Krainer 2007, Chambers et al 2005 and Bostic
and Surette 2004 look into the causal factors of increased homeownership.
sold into the secondary market is discontinuously lower below the cutoff, which is
consistent with marginal loans not conforming to the standards of secondary market
purchasers. Other results that look directly at loan and borrower characteristics available
in the HDMA do not yield strong evidence that loan composition is changing across the
cutoff.
In the next section, I discuss CRA in more detail and some of the previous
literature trying to identify its impact. Section 3 discusses the HMDA data in more detail
and also compares summary statistics from these data to comparable statistics drawn
from the Census and CPS in order to gauge HMDA's reliability. Section 4 discusses the
regression discontinuity strategy and Section 5 presents the results. Finally, in Section 6 I
summarize and draw some conclusions about the impact CRA may have had on
homeownership over the period in question based on the empirical results from Section 5
combined with other available evidence.
2.2. Background & Related Literature
Congress passed the CRA in 1977 in response to claims that banks were helping
to uphold a historical practice of irrationally redlining low-income, urban
neighborhoods.3 CRA originally mandated that federally insured deposit institutions
must help meet the banking and credit needs of the entire community where they earn
deposits. In practice, this means providing evidence to regulators that they are supplying
credit in both high and low income neighborhoods within their operating market. A 1995
reform, which went into full effect by mid-1997, added non-geographic criteria to CRA.
In particular, banks also have to demonstrate that they are providing credit to low-income
borrowers (regardless of the borrower's neighborhood income) and to small businesses.4
To be clear, this paper focuses on estimating CRA's effect on lending to low-income
borrowers.
Regulators periodically inspect banks' lending records (largely using HMDA) to
judge their compliance with CRA. CRA applies to bank and thrift institutions covered by
federal deposit insurance. It does not apply to non-deposit independent mortgage
companies or credit unions. Non-deposit mortgage subsidiaries of banks are not covered
either, but banks can include lending by their subsidiaries in their CRA evaluations.
Examiners rate banks in each of their "assessment area(s)" - generally the MSA's and/or
counties where they have branches - separately and then combine these ratings into an
overall grade (outstanding, satisfactory, needs to improve and substantial
noncompliance).
Regulators can penalize banks with poor CRA evaluations. Applications that
banks submit to merge with another bank or open a bank branch can be denied by
regulators on CRA grounds. CRA also provides a formal outlet for community
organizations to voice dissatisfaction with banks operating in their area. Regulators must
weigh evidence brought by the public regarding bank compliance with CRA before
deciding on a bank's merger application. Community groups, which are particularly
active in large cities, use the detailed mortgage lending data available through HMDA
3 For example, FHA underwriting manuals through the 1950's explicitly warned lenders against lending in minority
neighborhoods, and Gotham (2000) cites examples of continued discriminatory language in private underwriting and
appraisal manuals through the 1970's. Also see Jackson (1985) for an account of FHA's redlining policies.
4 See Barr (2005) and Fishbein (1992) for more on CRA's history.
and small business lending data disclosed by banks under CRA to challenge bank
applications.5 One response by banks has been to enter into "CRA Agreements" with
community groups where banks pledge a certain amount of resources to targeted
neighborhoods (see Bhutta 2008a). Bostic and Robinson (2005) find that banks do
increase targeted lending during the years in which an agreement is in effect. And
bankers interviewed by Harvard's Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS) said that
many banks have taken considerable steps toward increasing CRA-qualified loans to
avoid CRA-associated difficulties and bad press (Belsky et al 2000).
In order to quantify banks' efforts toward meeting CRA objectives, regulators
define low and moderate income (LMI) borrowers as those with income below 80% of
their MSA's median family income. And then as part of the CRA evaluation, regulators
measure a bank's volume of lending to LMI borrowers and compare this volume to that
of its peers as well as to the bank's non-LMI lending volume. Regulators therefore give
banks "CRA-credit" as a discontinuous function of borrower income. So to measure
CRA's effect, I will measure the jump in loan volume at the point where CRA-credit
jumps.
This strategy differs from most other studies of CRA. A few studies test for bank-
specific reactions to particular CRA incentives, with mixed results. Dahl et al (2002)
show that changes in CRA-type lending is uncorrelated with CRA rating downgrades in
the early 1990's. In contrast, Bostic and Robinson (2005) find that banks increase
targeted lending during the years in which they have a CRA agreement in effect, and
Bostic et al (2005) find that merging banks' CRA-qualified lending increases prior to
acquisitions of other banks.
Other studies, as this one, try to estimate CRA's impact more broadly. JCHS
researchers (2002) show that banks make a higher fraction of their loans to and are less
likely to deny loan applications from CRA-targeted populations inside the bank's
assessment area (i.e. where banks get "CRA credit") compared to outside those
geographic boundaries. But because bank operations likely differ in areas where they
have branches relative to where they do not - for instance, better knowledge of the local
market and population which may allow more lending to low-income borrowers - this
test lacks a causal interpretation. 6
A few studies (Schill and Wachter 1994, Evanoff and Segal 1996, Bostic and
Surette 2004) find that unregulated LMI loan growth exceeds that of regulated lenders,
implying CRA's effect has been limited. But excessive unregulated loan growth suggests
that the trend in unregulated lending is not likely to provide a valid counterfactual to test
CRA's effect on bank behavior, perhaps because unregulated lending operates under a
different business model. Another concern is that reductions in underreporting during the
1990's likely inflate loan growth for independent mortgage companies more so than for
banks (JCHS 2002).
Finally, Berry and Lee (2006 working paper) conduct a regression discontinuity
analysis and conclude CRA has no impact on banks, but their study differs from the one
' For instance, protest of a merger application by WesBanco in 2001 resulted in a year long delay. See
NCRC (2002).
6 They also exploit variation across MSA's in CRA Agreements. As the authors acknowledge, this strategy
also does not have a causal interpretation since MSA's where banks sign into agreements are likely to be
different from other MSA's and CRA agreements locations may be endogenous.
here in a number of ways. First, they test for a discontinuity in loan rejection rates at the
cutoff, which assumes that application volume and quality is exogenous. But banks may
advertise in order to generate more applications and (high-risk) borrowers are more likely
to apply when the likelihood of acceptance rises, so it is important to analyze loan
volume and application volume separately. Indeed, Bhutta (2008a) finds that both
originations and applications rise in CRA-targeted census tracts, calling into question
Berry and Lee's assumptions.
Second, I allow for differential effects of CRA over time and across MSA's of
different size, guided by information about CRA enforcement practices. Since CRA's
impact is likely to be concentrated in large MSA's (see Bhutta 2008a), focusing on these
areas can help to identify, quantify and describe CRA's impact. Also importantly, Berry
and Lee pool data from 1993 to 2003, but CRA did not award banks for lending to LMI
borrowers until after the 1995 reform. In other words, they combine years when CRA
should not have had an effect with years when it may have, which reduces the ability to
identify small effects. Finally, I analyze separately banks and their mortgage company
subsidiaries. Banks have the option to include lending by their subsidiaries in their CRA
exam. Some have argued (e.g. Marsico 2006) that banks may game CRA, for instance by
referring non-LMI borrowers to their subsidiaries to help increase the bank's proportion
of LMI loans. Separately analyzing banks and their subsidiaries will allow me to test this
"crowd-out" scenario. Similarly, I will test for a discontinuity in lending by independent
mortgage companies that will indicate whether these lenders are crowded out by
increased bank lending (as suggested in the JCHS study).
2.3. Data
Data on individual mortgage applications comes from information submitted by
lenders under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA 1977). Since 1990, lenders
covered by HMDA have been required to compile and submit detailed information on the
individual mortgage applications they receive. And in 1993 HMDA expanded coverage
to include the majority of independent mortgage companies, which extend about a third
of home purchase loans.7
Importantly, HMDA includes lender identification information that allows one to
match each application to its class of lender. I divide institutions into the three groups:
"banks", which fall under CRA authority; "mortgage subsidiaries of banks" which may
be directly affected by CRA because of their bank affiliation; and "independent mortgage
companies", which fall entirely outside the purview of CRA. Credit unions, which
extend a very small share of mortgage credit, are included in this last group because they
also fall outside the reach of CRA.
Applicants' gross family income is another key piece of information in the
HMDA for this analysis as it allows determination of which applications qualify as CRA
loans. Some of the other variables available in the HMDA that will be used in this
analysis are the census tract of the property, the type of loan being applied for (e.g. home
purchase), the loan amount, the disposition of the application (e.g. denied), whether the
loan was sold by the lender into the secondary market, and a few demographic
7 See FFIEC website (www.ftlec.gov) for details on which institutions are still exempt from reporting.
characteristics such as race and gender. Table 1 provides a more complete description of
the HMDA variables.8
For each year of HMDA data used in the analysis, I use owner-occupied home
purchase applications for which income is reported (more than 95% of reported
applications) and can be matched to an MSA (i.e. loans that have a valid census tract
code, which I then match to that tract's MSA). I exclude Hawaii and Alaska MSA loans
from the analysis.
The top panel of Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics from the HMDA
using all home purchase loans originated in MSA's. The left half of the table shows
levels statistics for 1999. I chose this year so that I could compare the statistics of
borrowers in the HMDA to those of recent home buyers from the 2000 Census (Panel B).
The first row indicates that nearly 3.7 million loans were reported with a just under 1.2
million of those being to LMI borrowers. This volume compares to about 4.7 million
new home buyers in the Census. These are household heads that indicate having moved
in 2000 or 1999, own their current residence and have a mortgage. Much of the
difference in volume between HMDA and the Census is likely explained by the fact that
the Census includes movers during the first quarter of 2000 in addition to movers during
1999. As such, these results suggest that the vast majority of home purchase mortgage
activity in MSA's by 1999 is covered by HMDA. This is an important observation that
has not, to my knowledge, been documented elsewhere.
HMDA and Census statistics on race, gender and marital status are similar
although in all cases HMDA proportions for such groups are lower than in the Census.
This is because a sizeable number of loans are submitted via the internet or mail and in
many instances borrower characteristics, especially race, are not reported for these loans.
Overall, LMI borrowers/buyers are younger, less educated, more likely to be of a
minority group, less likely to be married, and are more likely to purchase a condominium
or mobile home.
The right half of Panel A shows annualized growth in the variables between 1994
and 2002. The right half of Panel B provides benchmarks using the CPS over a similar
period, again drawing respondents that recently moved and own their home (mortgage
status is not identified). One notable result is that loan growth in the HMDA greatly
exceeds that indicated by the CPS because of underreporting in earlier years. Further, the
difference in growth rates across the HMDA and CPS is greater for the non-LMI group.
These results suggest HMDA is not likely to provide an accurate description of changes
in the mortgage market. Near the bottom of Panel A one can see that banks' (i.e. CRA
regulated) share of LMI loans (i.e. CRA-eligible) are falling. This finding echoes that in
Bostic and Surette (2004). But as argued earlier, this result tells us little about CRA's
impact because of, among other reasons, the unreliability of HMDA in measuring
changes over time.
2.4. Empirical Design
2.4.1 Regression Discontinuity
I take advantage of a sharp discontinuity in CRA's eligibility rule to identify the
impact of CRA on home purchase loan volume. Since mid-1997 banks' CRA
performance is based in part on their volume of lending to low and moderate income
8 Also see Avery et al (2007) for an in depth review of the HMDA data.
(LMI) individuals. LMI borrowers are defined as those with gross family income less
than 80% of median family income of the MSA of residence 9. In the regression
discontinuity (RD) analysis that follows, this ratio of applicant income to MSA median
family income is the "assignment" (or "running") variable and is referred to as R.
Therefore, families with R<0.80 form CRA's target population. MSA median family
income is measured each year and reported by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). Importantly, these MSA-level income estimates are also used both
by lenders and regulators to determine which loans qualify for "CRA credit". Thus, for
each loan I am able to calculate the true value of R.
For each of the three types of institutions, I count the number of home purchase
loans within MSA-year-income bins where income is in $1000 increments corresponding
to the fact that lenders report income rounded to the nearest thousand.' 0 I focus on
CRA's effect in MSA's since CRA enforcement has historically emphasized urban areas,
and because HMDA coverage of MSA's is more consistent and reliable than for non-
metro areas (Avery et al 2007).
The strategy for quantifying CRA's causal impact is to measure the discontinuity
in bank-originated loan volume at the 0.80 cutoff. The key advantage of the RD design is
that characteristics of the underlying population are nearly identical just above and below
this cutoff. In other words, in the absence of CRA, one would not expect a jump in loan
volume at R = 0.80. As such, this strategy is not confounded by the major concurrent
changes in financial markets. I implement local RD methods described in Imbens and
Lemieux (2008). The causal effect of CRA on loan volume, i, will be estimated by the
following regression.
(4.1) YlM, = flDw, + C(RIMI,) + eM,
where YIMt is the (log) number of loans to borrowers of income I in MSA M in year t,
DIMt=1[RMt<0.80], and C(RMt) is a (unknown) smooth function controlling for the
relationship between loan volume and relative income. Observations will be weighted
using kernel weights WIMt = K([RiMt - 0.80]/h), where h is some chosen bandwidth - i.e.
observations more than h away from the cutoff will not be used to estimate the
discontinuity.
The primary obstacles in estimating (4.1) are modeling the control function (i.e.
C(RIM)) and choosing h. I pursue a strategy similar in spirit to that of Ludwig and Miller
(2007), presenting several estimates under different bandwidths and choices of the
control function. I also present results using both a simple rectangular kernel - K(a) =
1[0 lJal< 1] - as well as a triangular kernel - K(a) = 1[0 laJ< l]*(l-!al). A credible
discontinuity should be robust to the choice of weighting scheme (Imbens and Lemieux
2008). In all regressions, I include MSA by year fixed effects so that / is identified only
from variation in loan volume across the cutoff within MSA by year cells.
9 For borrowers outside of an MSA, LMI is defined using the median family income of the state's non-
metropolitan counties.
"o Although income is measured discretely, the running variable is essentially continuous since regulators
do not round R and thus I am not concerned about specification error due to discreteness as described in
Lee and Card (2008).
As a starting point, I show nonparametric estimates for a small bandwidth (h =
0.02). These estimates simply compare mean loan volume just to the left and to that just
right of the cutoff. In terms of (4.1), this strategy sets C(RIM) to zero. As shown by
Porter (2003), bias under this method increases in the slope of the relationship between Y
and R.
If the outcome and assignment variables are highly correlated around the cutoff, a
preferred RD strategy is local linear regression. Under this method two (kernel weighted)
linear functions are estimated (one on either side of the cutoff) and the effect of CRA is
calculated as the difference in the limits of these functions at the cutoff. In terms of(4.1),
C(RIM) takes the form:
(4.2) C(R)= R 'Mt + R '*[R, <0.80],
R'IM = RM, - 0.80
Local linear regression based estimates will be presented for bandwidths of 0.04
and 0.06. Finally, for the largest bandwidth used (h = 0.06), I also estimate quadratic
functions on either side of the cutoff as opposed to linear functions. OLS robust standard
errors are reported." It is expected that a substantive discontinuity will be robust to these
alternative specifications.
Figure 4 plots loan volume from 1998 to 2005 against reported borrower
(nominal) income. Reported income does not appear to be smoothly distributed as there
are spikes at different income levels, particularly those incomes divisible by $5000. The
most pronounced spike occurs at $60,000. These spikes do not necessarily reflect poor
reporting by banks - family income in the CPS generates a similar pattern (not shown).
Regardless, in the regressions that follow I will include two dummy variables - one
indicating for income divisible by $5000 and another indicating for income of $60,000 -
to help ensure that the discontinuous distribution of income does not drive the results.
2.4.2. Gaming Behavior by Banks
If a discontinuity in loan volume is detected, an important question from an
interpretive standpoint is whether lenders misreport income in order to help satisfy their
CRA obligations. For instance, perhaps banks deliberately round down the income of an
applicant that would have been just above the cutoff in order to get "CRA credit". One
reason this may not actually occur in practice is that regulators test banks' reporting
quality by cross-checking HMDA records with actual loan records and can punish banks
for misreporting. 12
Nevertheless, I can run two tests that might help resolve this issue. One test
utilizes the micro loan data to estimate "who" the marginal borrowers are. If banks are
actually extending credit to new borrowers, then borrower composition just below the
cutoff should be of lower quality than above the cutoff.
A second test looks at loan sales into the secondary market around the cutoff. If
borrower quality just below the cutoff is in fact deteriorating, this may show up in the
" Clustering the standard errors at the MSA level may be theoretically justified, but clustering in this way
generally yielded smaller standard errors and so I present only robust standard errors.
12 See Interagency Examination Procedures at http:i/www.fdic.govinewsinews/financial/2006/fil06033.htmi
form of fewer sales of loans into the secondary market since these loans may not conform
to the usual guidelines of secondary market purchasers (e.g. Quercia et al 2001).
These tests are conducted within the same RD framework as described above,
except YIMt will represent variables such as the proportion of loans in bin IMt that were
sold into the secondary market.
2.5. Results
2.5.1. Aggregate Results
The top panel of Figure 5 plots bank home purchase loan volume against the
assignment variable, R, aggregating data from all MSA's and years 1998 to 2005. Each
data point represents loan volume in a two percentage point bin of R. A line is drawn at
the CRA cutoff and loan volume appears to change smoothly across the cutoff (i.e. there
is no indication of a CRA effect).
The relationship is highly nonlinear, especially near the cutoff (the rise and then
fall of loan volume across income reflects the total number of households in the
underlying population in each bin), suggesting that a "global" RD strategy would be
difficult to implement reliably. The bottom panel zooms in on data in a relatively small
window around the cutoff (0.60 < R 5 1.00), and also displays a nonparametric fit of the
data on either side of the cutoff.13 Again, there is no indication of a CRA effect.
Table 3 provides regression results corresponding to Figure 5 using the
methodology described in Section 4. Columns 1 and 2 use rectangular and triangular
kernel weights, respectively, with h=0.02 and does not include a control function. These
specifications yield similar point estimates indicating an effect of CRA on bank home
purchase loan volume of between 2% and 3%. Columns 3 and 4 set h to 0.04 and again
exclude a control function, and the point estimates rise slightly but are not substantively
different from those using h = 0.02.
Columns 5 and 6 include a linear control function as specified in (1.2) above. The
slope coefficients (third and fourth rows) suggest a negative relationship between loan
volume and R to the right of the cutoff, and including the control function pushes the
discontinuity point estimates close to zero. In fact, the point estimates in columns 3 and 4
lie further than two standard errors away from the point estimates in columns 5 and 6,
respectively. As discussed previously, the bias of the nonparametric RD estimates in the
first four columns will rise in the (absolute value of the) slope of the control function.
Columns 7 thru 12 set h to 0.06. A larger bandwidth utilizes more data, which
helps in estimating the control function. At the same time, a larger bandwidth is more
likely to generate bias due to an improperly specified control function. The standard
errors in columns 9 and 10 are smaller than those in columns 5 and 6, while the point
estimates are about three times larger and the discontinuity estimate in column 9 is
statistically significant. The last two columns of Table 3 include quadratic terms in the
control function. These terms turn out to be significant and both discontinuity point
estimates become statistically indistinguishable from zero. Overall, Table 3 suggests
CRA has on average had little effect, if any, on loan volume.
~3 For this exercise I simply use the Stata "lowess" command to fit the data using the default options which
employs a bandwidth that uses 80% of the data and tri-cube kernel weights.
2.5.2. Disaggregated Results
Now I allow for the effect of CRA to vary over time and across MSA's of
different size. As argued in Bhutta (2008a) CRA enforcement is sharpest in the largest
MSAs, and RD estimates CRA's effect on lending to LMI census tracts found in Bhutta
(2008a) reflect such an enforcement pattern.
CRA's effect may also vary over time for several reasons. One is regulatory
changes to CRA implemented in 2004 and 2005 that may have weakened its impact
(Marsico 2006). Another is the surge in subprime credit supply during the first half of
this decade (see Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 2006) that may have made CRA
superfluous.' 4 And merger activity, which makes CRA more salient an issue for banks,
peaked in the late 1990's and then dropped to considerably lower levels by 2003.
The top, middle and bottom panels of Figure 6 show RD results for small,
medium and large MSA's, respectively. Each point represents the estimated
discontinuity using specification 6 of Table 3 (i.e. triangular kernel with h = 4 and linear
control function) for the sample of MSA's listed at the top of the graph and four years of
data around the year listed on the x-axis (see Figure 6 notes for more details). A dashed
vertical line was placed at 1997.5, indicating the point in time at which the 1995 changes
to CRA (i.e. including banks' lending to LMI borrowers in their CRA exam) were fully
implemented.
Mirroring the pattern of results in Bhutta (2008), the top two panels provide no
evidence of a CRA impact in small or medium size MSA's while the bottom panel
reveals evidence of a CRA impact in the largest MSA's in the 5-6 year period following
full implementation of the 1995 reforms. The estimates labeled as being for 1999, 2000
and 2001 utilize data from 1997 to 2002 and show a statistically significant impact of just
over 5%. The first and second points in this graph use data largely prior to the reform
and so are expected to be zero. The point estimates do not fall right on zero, but they
cannot be distinguished from zero. The last three points suggest CRA's impact was only
temporary consistent with market forces eliminating the "need" for CRA and/or the 2004-
2005 changes reducing CRA's impact.
Panel A of Table 4 tests the robustness of the finding of a positive CRA impact
for large MSA's. Table 4 also provides similar estimates for the other two types of
lending institutions: somewhat regulated mortgage company subsidiaries (Panel B) and
unregulated independent mortgage companies (Panel C). I do not report the slope
coefficients in Table 4 to save space.
The discontinuity estimates in Panel A for banks are quite robust across the
different specifications. Unlike in Table 3, the point estimates are very similar in moving
from columns 3 and 4 to columns 5 and 6 which include a control function. Indeed, the
slope coefficients (not shown) for this subsample are comparatively small and not
statistically significant as they were in Table 3.15 In other words, the relationship
14 In other words, borrowers both above and below the cutoff could more easily obtain credit in the new
environment of relaxed credit standards. For instance, in a push to expand loan volume Countrywide eased
credit standards considerably by 2003 (Hagerty and Simpson 2008). Indeed, I find that home purchase loan
volume (all lenders) in the HMDA for MSA borrowers with R around the CRA cutoff (those between 70
and 90) rose by nearly 30% between 2002 and 2005 after zero growth from 1999 to 2002.
1S For instance, the coefficients (standard error) on the terms on R' and (R')*1[R < 0.80] for the regression
in column 5 are -0.0025 (0.0079) and 0.0094 (0.011), respectively.
between bank home purchase loan volume and R seems relatively flat in the
neighborhood of the cutoff and so adding a control function does not matter greatly. As
such, the estimates in columns 3 and 4 which exclude a control function provide both
reliable and relatively efficient estimates of the discontinuity.
Panel B provides some evidence of a CRA impact on home purchase lending
volume by banks' mortgage subsidiaries of about 2-4%. The point estimates are quite
similar across the specifications (the largest point estimate is 0.037 in columns 2 and 9
and the smallest point estimate 0.022 in column 3), but not all are statistically significant.
Importantly, these results bear no sign of banks referring non-LMI loans to their
mortgage affiliates while servicing LMI loans themselves as some have suggested they
might do (e.g. Marsico 2006). Perhaps manipulation of this sort is costly relative to the
benefits of achieving a higher CRA grade.
Panel C provides no evidence that CRA affects unregulated independent mortgage
companies. Eight of the ten point estimates are no larger than 0.02 and none are
statistically significant. Again, there is no evidence that increased lending by banks due
to CRA crowds out non-bank lenders. At the same time, the lack of a positive
discontinuity for independent mortgage companies reinforces the interpretation of the
results in Panel A that the measured discontinuity for banks represents the causal effect of
CRA.
Figure 7 provides results of another falsification exercise where I test for
discontinuities at points in the neighborhood around the CRA cutoff. An important
identification assumption is that the relationship between loan volume and R would be
smooth at the CRA cutoff in the absence of CRA. While not directly testable, confidence
in this assumption would be bolstered if the empirical relationship were found to be
smooth (i.e. no discontinuities) at points around the cutoff.
The top, middle and bottom panels show results of this falsification exercise using
specifications 1, 3 and 5, respectively, from Table 4. In the top panel the only
statistically significant discontinuity other than at the CRA cutoff is at R = 0.81. But this
discontinuity actually reflects the CRA-induced discontinuity since the RD estimate at
0.81 compares a control mean that uses data between 0.81 and 0.83 against a "treatment"
mean that uses data between 0.79 and 0.81 (i.e. some observations are part of the true
treatment group). Elsewhere, the estimated discontinuities lie around the zero line and
none are statistically significant. Similarly, the middle panel indicates that the largest
discontinuity under the 3rd specification occurs at the true CRA cutoff and then the
estimates trail off smoothly on either side of this cutoff and are zero almost everywhere
else. Approaching R = 0.70 small negative discontinuities appear, which reflects the
downward sloping portion of the relationship between loan volume and R (see top panel
of Figure 5) combined with a larger bandwidth relative to estimates in the top panel (i.e.
increased bias).
The bottom panel is somewhat less well-behaved, generating three negative
discontinuities within 3-percentage points of the CRA cutoff. Again, these non-CRA
discontinuities may simply reflect the CRA-induced discontinuity at 0.80 since these non-
CRA RD estimates combine data above and below the actual CRA cutoff. Outside of the
points immediately around the CRA cutoff, the RD estimates lie much closer to the zero
line and none are statistically significant. Overall, the results in Figure 7 are encouraging
in that they indicate the empirical relationship between loan volume and R is generally
smooth except for at the CRA cutoff.
2.5.3. Changes in Portfolio Characteristics
If banks did in fact extend more credit to marginal applicants because of CRA
then the risk characteristics of the loan portfolio just below the CRA cutoff should be
different than the characteristics of the portfolio just above. In this section I perform two
tests to gauge whether such a change has occurred.
In the first test I use individual loan and borrower characteristics along with
application outcomes (e.g. application denied by lender) to predict each application's
probability of being denied given those characteristics. I will then test for sharp
differences in the share of loans to the (predicted) highest and lowest "risk" borrowers
across the CRA cutoff. Of course, predicted denial probabilities reflect underlying risk as
well as other factors. For instance, I find that minorities are more likely to be denied,
which reflects both the fact that minorities typically have lower credit scores (not
observed in HMDA) as well as discrimination they may encounter.
The second test uses information in HMDA on whether a loan is sold to
secondary market purchasers, specifically testing whether there is a sharp change in the
share of loans sold across the CRA cutoff. Generally, for a loan to be sold into the
secondary market its risk characteristics (e.g. borrower income and credit score, loan
amount to house value ratio, etc.) relative to its interest rate must conform to certain
specifications. "Affordable" loans designed for marginal borrowers are less likely to be
"cookie-cutter" loans typically sold into secondary and instead will be held in portfolio
by the originating institution (e.g. see Avery et al 2000 and Quercia et al 2001). As such,
if banks are making specialized loans to reach out to new borrowers then the share of
loans just below the cutoff that are sold should be lower than that share just above the
cutoff.
To estimate the risk of an application, I first run the following regression:
(5.1) de nyj,t = + X jMt P M + At +EjM,
where denyjMt is an indicator variable equal to one if application j in MSA M and year t
was denied by the lender, x is a vector of loan and borrower characteristics, A is a set of
MSA by year fixed effects and the coefficients on x are allowed to vary by MSA and
year. (5.1) is run using all home purchase applications at banks with R between 0.70 and
0.90 and for which a credit decision was made. I don't include applications that were
withdrawn by the lender due to incompleteness or were withdrawn by the applicant
before the lender's decision was made. 16 The variables in x are as follows:
* Amount-to-income ratio; I create five groups: (0, 0.5], (0.5, 1.5], (1.5, 3], (3,
4], (4, oo)
* (log) Median home value of census tract where property is being purchased
* Race/Ethnicity; I create five groups: White, Asian, Black, Hispanic and Other,
which is comprised mostly of mail/internet applications where race is
unreported, but also includes Native American
'6 1 also drop loans recorded as being farm loans.
* Primary applicant sex; there are three groups: male, female and unreported on
mail/internet application' 7
* Co-applicant sex; there are four groups: male, female unreported on
mail/internet application and no co-applicant
* Loan type: there are three groups: conventional, FHA-insured, VA-insured
Using the estimated coefficients I generate predicted values which yield predicted
risk distributions by MSA and year:
deny,, = -+ xxy, ,, + p(5.2) den = + +
deny,,, 
-+ fM,
Finally, I assign each application a number 1-5 corresponding to its quintile in its
MSA by year distribution.
Table 5 shows summary statistics that result from this process for the year 2000.
The first number in the top row shows that there were almost 93,000 home purchase
applications in the sample for year 2000. The next two columns show statistics for those
loans that fall into the last and first quintiles, respectively, of their predicted risk
distribution as described above. As such, about 20% of all applications fall into each
category. The second row shows that about 19% of all applications are denied. About
37% classified as high risk are denied while only 9% of applications categorized as low
risk are denied.
Table 5 also indicates that high risk loans tend to have a relatively low loan
amount-to-income ratio. Since, all else equal, risk rises with the amount-to-income ratio,
the negative correlation in the data indicates that low ratios must reflect other deficiencies
of the application.
Further comparison of columns 2 and 3 shows that higher denial rates are
correlated with neighborhoods that have relatively low home values, with being Black or
Hispanic, as well as with being a mail/internet application. A substantial share (about
23%) of low risk applications are FHA-insured. Applicants that meet the requirements to
apply for an FHA loan represent a low risk to the bank since these loans are insured and
therefore are unlikely to be denied. Finally, the last row indicates that the probability of a
loan being sold into the secondary market is negatively correlated with risk.
Panels A and B of Table 6 show RD results where the outcome variables are the
(log) high and low risk proportion of bank originations, respectively. Panel A does not
provide strong evidence that the share of highest risk applications has increased. Eight of
ten coefficients are positive, but only one specification generates a statistically significant
coefficient. The lack of a sharp rise in Panel A suggests the rise in lending by banks is
not concentrated at the upper tail of the risk distribution.
Panel B provides some evidence of a fall in the proportion the lowest risk
applications. Six of the ten specifications yield statistically significant estimates around
0.04 or 4%. Such a drop indicates that the increase in bank lending of about 6% as
17 A very small fraction (less than 0.1%) of applications in HMDA are recorded under a fourth group "NA".
I drop these applications.
measured earlier occurs disproportionately outside of the lower tail of the risk
distribution. This conclusion is tempered by the finding in columns 5, 6, 9 and 10. The
somewhat more flexible specifications in columns 5, 6 are not significant, and the
estimates in columns 9 and 10 which use a quadratic control function yield estimates just
below zero.
The results of the second test, given in Panel C, are more robust and indicate that
the risk characteristics of marginal loans differ from the average. All of the
specifications in Panel C yield similar and statistically significant results suggesting a
decline in the proportion of loans sold by about 4%. This result implies that a majority of
the "extra" loans made by banks because of CRA are not sold into the secondary market,
which is consistent with these loans being made under flexible terms aimed at marginal
borrowers such that they do not conform to the requirements of secondary market
purchasers.
2.5.4. The GSE Act as a Potential Confounder
The GSE Act (1992) created mortgage funding goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. One of these, the "Special Affordable" goal, targets borrowers with income less
than 80% of the MSA median family income (i.e. identical to CRA) that are purchasing a
home in a census tract that has median family income less than 80% of the MSA median
family income. The GSE Act may therefore confound the interpretation that
discontinuity in loan volume at R = 0.80 is due to CRA. However, a number of factors
suggest that the observed impact is due to entirely to CRA.
For one, the only discontinuity in loan volume found thus far occurs in large
MSAs, consistent with patterns of CRA enforcement. Any GSE effect is not expected to
follow this pattern. Second, this discontinuity is found only for banking institutions and
somewhat for banks' subsidiaries, while no discontinuity is found for independent
mortgage companies. Again, if the GSE program were effective it would be expected to
affect all types of lenders. Finally, of the three goals of the GSE Act, the 'Special
Affordable' is allotted the fewest resources.
Table 7 provides more concrete evidence that the GSE program does not help
explain the discontinuity in loan volume at R = 0.80. In Table 7 I estimate the
discontinuity in loan volume at R = 0.80 separately for two groups of loans: those loans
that are for purchase of a property in a GSE-qualified census tract (Panel A) and those
loans that are for purchase of a property outside of GSE-qualified census tracts (Panel B).
If the GSE program has a substantive effect, then the estimates in Panel A should exceed
those in Panel B.
First, notice that only about 16% of loan volume near the CRA cutoff (4,106 loans
out of 25,485) occurs in GSE-qualified tracts, implying that the GSE effect would have to
be extremely large in order to explain the discontinuity in loan volume. The results in
columns 1-4 do suggest that the discontinuity may be larger in GSE-qualified tracts, but
in the remainder of the columns where a control function is included in the regressions
the estimates in Panel A are smaller and insignificant relative to those in Panel B. These
results along with the reasoning above suggest the GSE Act has very little, if anything, to
do with the discontinuity in bank lending.
2.5.4. CRA's Effect on Applications and Dollars Lent
The final empirical exercise explores the effect of CRA on loan applications and
dollars lent at the cutoff. Again, I will focus on the largest MSA's between 1998 and
2002 where a substantive discontinuity in originations is found.
Panels A and B in Table 8 display estimates of the discontinuity in applications
received by banks and mortgage company subsidiaries of banks, respectively. I include
all applications a lender receives and records in HMDA including those that are
withdrawn prior to a credit decision being made. The point estimates are very similar to
those found for Table 4 for total originations. Since the outcome variables have been log-
transformed, the results imply that applications are increasing at the about the same rate
as originations. This finding is important because it indicates that applications are
endogenous. Researchers may be tempted to use the origination rate as the outcome
variable (e.g. Berry and Lee 2008), but such a strategy will typically generate misleading
results if banks react to CRA by soliciting more applications or if application volume and
quality responds to banks' increased willingness to lend in response to CRA.
Panels C and D display the estimates of CRA's effect on total dollars originated
by banks and their subsidiaries. For banks, all of the specifications generate statistically
significant results and with the exception of specifications 3 and 4 all of the estimates lie
around 0.06. This magnitude is similar to the effect on loan volume, which suggests that
the loan amount of marginal loans is similar to the average loan. This result may seem
somewhat surprising - if banks are making more loans to marginal borrowers, one might
expect them to provide smaller loans to mitigate this risk. However, a larger loan amount
than might otherwise be approved given the risk characteristics of the borrower is also a
way banks may increase their lending. In other words, there is no clear expectation for
whether CRA's effect (in proportional terms) on dollars lent should be bigger or smaller
than its effect on originations.
That the average loan amount is not changing at the cutoff implies that the loan-
to-income ratio is also not changing (since income is virtually the same on either side of
the cutoff). Yet, although this risk factor is not changing, marginal loans are less likely to
be sold to secondary market purchasers as indicated by the results in Table 6 (Panel C),
suggesting that some other risk factor may be changing, such as the loan to property
value ratio, or the credit score of marginal borrowers.
2.6. Summary and Discussion
In this paper, I have identified CRA's impact on home purchase lending to low-
income borrowers by exploiting a discontinuity in the rules regulators use to judge banks'
compliance with CRA. Using local regression discontinuity techniques I find that CRA's
impact at the cutoff is on average not statistically different from zero and no larger than
3%. Exploring the data more finely, I do find a robust jump in loan volume of about 6%
at the cutoff in the largest MSA's during a 5-6 year period after CRA was strengthened
and merger activity was at a peak. These results mirror those in Bhutta (2008a), which
finds that CRA's effect on lending to low and moderate income neighborhoods is
concentrated in the largest MSA's between 1997 and 2002.
Interpreting this discontinuity as a causal effect of CRA is bolstered by the
absence of a discontinuity for unregulated independent mortgage companies in large
MSAs during the same period. Further, I find that the relationship between loan volume
and the assignment variable is otherwise smooth - that is, I do not find discontinuities at
points away from the cutoff, suggesting that the one found at the cutoff is not spurious.
Importantly, I do not find evidence of crowd-out or gaming behavior that has been
suggested elsewhere. In particular, mortgage company subsidiaries of banks do not show
a jump in non-LMI loan volume at the cutoff, nor is there evidence that independent
mortgage companies are crowded out by the increased lending by banks in the large
MSA's.
These results may underestimate CRA's true impact if banks have reacted to CRA
in a "smooth" way. In other words, CRA may have changed the slope of the relationship
between loan volume and the assignment variable over time rather than inducing a large
"jump" in lending at the cutoff. Another shortcoming of the regression discontinuity
design is that it says little about CRA's effect away from the cutoff.
The 6% impact for banks in large MSA's implies a level impact at the cutoff of
about 1,400 home purchase loans at a value of approximately $200 million. If one
assumes this effect applies up to five percentage points away from the cutoff, the level
impact would measure approximately 4,600 loans at a value of $630 million. And if one
assumes a constant effect of 6% for all loan volume below the cutoff (i.e. observed loan
volume below the cutoff in large MSAs is 6% higher than it would be in the absence of
CRA), this would amount to nearly 35,000 loans at a value of $3.9 billion. Importantly,
even under this generous assumption and assuming that all of these marginal loans are for
first time homeownership, CRA's impact on the homeownership rate would be
negligible. Consistent with this conclusion that CRA has likely had little to do with the
rise in homeownership rates, I find essentially no difference in the growth rate of
homeownership between large and small MSAs between 1994 and 2004 (see Figure 8).
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Notes: Sample includes households in an MSA. Low (high) income families defined as those with family
income (income of household head plus that of spouse) below (above) the median family income in the
family's state and year of survey; state-by-year median income calculated by author from CPS
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Notes: Sample includes households in an MSA with household head aged between 24 and 60.
Predicted homeownership rates calculated by applying coefficients estimated from a linear regression
of homeownership dummy on household head characteristics using a pooled sample from 1989 to
1991 to household head characteristics in subsequent years. Characteristics used are dummy
variables for college-educated, married, black race, hispanic ethnicity, female and eight age groups.
These variables are fully interacted in one regression and interacted with family income (defined as
income of household head plus spouse) in the other. Family income is adjusted for inflation using CPI-
U.
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MSA's by income in $1,000 increments. Black bars indicate incomes divisible by $5000.
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Loan Volume vs. Assignment Variable
Home Purchase Originations by Banks, All MSA's, 1998-2005
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Discontintuity in Lending to LMI Borrowers Over Time
Home Purchase Originations by Banks
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Notes: tacn point represents the estimated discontinuity from an RD regression corresponding
to specification 6 in Table 2 for the sample of MSA's described above each graph. Each
regression uses four years of loan data: the year on the axis plus 2 years before and one year
after. MSA size groups based on population in 1990 Census: small MSA's are those withpopulation less than 500k, medium MSA's are those with population between 500k and 2mil, andlarge MSA's are those with population over 2mil. Groups are not a perfectly consistent set ofgeographic areas because of major changes in MSA definitions used in the 2004 and 2005 data.
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Estimated Discontinuity at CRA & non-CRA Cutoffs
Home Purchase Originations by Banks in Large MSA's, 1998-2002
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respectively, from Table 4 for each regression.
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Notes: Large MSAs comprised of the largest 20 MSAs in terms of total households (as measured in the CPS) in
1994 while the remainder of MSAs make up the set of small MSAs.
Table 1:
Primary Variables Available in HMDA
Dataset 1992-2005
Variable
Year
Institution ID
Regulatory Agency ID
Loan Type
Loan Purpose
Property Type
Occupancy
Loan Amount
HOEPA Status
Lien Status
Action Taken
Denial Reason (optional)
Geography
Income
Applicant(s) Ethnicity
Applicant(s) Race
Applicant(s) Sex
Purchaser
Availability
all years
all years
all years
all years
all years
2004-2005
all years
all years
2004-2005
2004-2005
all years
all years
all years
all years
2004-2005
all years
all years
all years
Description
Year of mortgage application or purchase
10 Character Lender Identifier
Code indicating OCC, Fed, FDIC, OTS, NCUA (credit unions) or HUD as supervisory agency
Conventional or government insured (e.g. FHA, VA)
Home purchase, refinance, home improvement or multifamily (i.e. 5+ family property)
1-4 Family, manufactured housing or multifamily structure
Owner-occupied or investment property/second home
Dollar amount of loan
Indicator for high-cost loan: APR at consummation exceeds yield for comparable Treasury by more than 8 percentage
points.
Loan secured by first or subordinate lien
Six possibilities: (1) Loan originated, (2) Borrower rejects lender offer (3) Application denied, (4) Application
withdrawn by applicant (5) Application incomplete, (6) Loan purchased by the institution
Institution can provide primary reason(s) for denial (e.g. credit history, insufficient collateral, debt load, etc)
State, county and census tract of property
Gross annual family income, rounded to the nearest thousand dollar
Indicator for being Hispanic/Latino; may not be provided if telephone/internet application. "Hispanic" is a choice under
Race variable in prior years
Race of primary applicant; race of co-applicant if applicable. May not be provided if telephone/internet application
Sex of primary applicant; sex of co-applicant if applicable. May not be provided if telephone/internet application
For loans sold at time of origination, specifies purchaser of loan (e.g. Fannie Mae, commercial bank, etc.)
,aae 19220
Table 2:
Summary Statistics: HMDA and Comparable Estimates from Census and CPS
A. HMDA Data Summary Statistics'
Levels, 1999 Annual %Change, 1994-2002
All LMI non-LMI All LMI non-LMI
Borrowers Borrowers Borrowers Borrowers Borrowers Borrowers
No. of Loans Reported (000's) 3,664 1,175 2,489 4.38 5.80 3.77
Med. Family Income ($) 69,681 39,818 88,345 1.05 1.36 1.57
Med. Loan Amount ($) 136,873 94,567 164,247 1.69 3.10 1.83
Prop. Borrowers Black 0.070 0.113 0.050 -0.53 -0.36 -1.26
(0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.33) (0.49) (0.43)
Prop. Borrowers Hispanic 0.081 0.118 0.064 3.15 3.55 2.51
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.38) (0.61) (0.47)
Prop. Borrowers Female 0.233 0.372 0.167 2.49 1.03 3.16
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.20) (0.23) (0.29)
Prop. Borrowers w/ Co-Applicant 0.517 0.285 0.627 -3.44 -5.02 -2.81
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.07) (0.19) (0.07)
Prop. Loans FHA 0.197 0.308 0.145 -0.46 0.19 -1.90
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.20) (0.27) (0.27)
Prop. Loans by Banks 0.328 0.298 0.342 -2.57 -3.01 -2.35
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.11) (0.21) (0.13)
1990 Med. Home Value in Census 196,067 149,705 217,952 0.00 -0.14 0.22
Tract of Property ($) (11,218) (6,861) (13,155) (0.00) (0.10) (0.07)
B. Comparable Statistics from Census & CPS Data
Levels, 1999 (Census) Annual %Change, 1992-2002 (CPS) 2
All LMI non-LMI All LMI non-LMI
Buyers Buyers Buyers Buyers Buyers Buyers
No. Purchased (000's)3  4,669 1,569 3,100 1.36 2.70 0.96
Med. Family Income ($) 70,552 35,089 93,322 0.62 1.60 1.55
Med. House Value ($) 165,527 114,364 195,623 na na na
Prop. HH Head Black 0.086 0.121 0.069 0.38 -0.19 0.69
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.63) (1.01) (1.19)
Prop. HH Head Hispanic 0.103 0.141 0.084 4.44 4.90 5.56
(0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.76) (1.23) (1.38)
Prop. HH Head Female 0.271 0.415 0.198 4.72 2.60 9.41
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.35) (0.44) (0.84)
Prop. Married HH 0.637 0.369 0.772 -0.55 -1.33 -0.09
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.14) (0.43) (0.15)
Prop. HH Head Age<35 0.386 0.45 0.354 0.06 0.31 -0.16
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.24) (0.45) (0.39)
Prop. HH Head College+ 0.397 0.234 0.479 1.61 4.04 1.81
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.27) (0.89) (0.33)
Prop. Units Condominium 0.089 0.122 0.073 0.55 -0.41 1.28
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.51) (0.81) (1.01)
Prop. Units Mobile Home 0.066 0.124 0.037 -4.69 -5.91 -8.64
(0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.66) (0.87) (1.46)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. All dollar figures adjusted to 2007 dollars using the CPI-U. (1) HMDA levels summary statisitics
based on 5% random sample of 1999 owner-occupied home purchase originations in MSA's identified in the 2000 Census; HMDA %change
statistics based on 1% random samples from 1994 and 2002 owner-occupied home purchase originations in MSA's identified in the CPS.
(2) Combines data from 1992, 1993, 1994, 2002, 2003 & 2004 rounds of March CPS. (3) Census columns use only buyers with a
mortgage; CPS does not seperate out 'free & clear' owners.
Table 3:
RD Estimates of CRA's Effect on Bank Home Purchase Loans to LMI Borrowers
All MSA's, 1998-2005
Dependent variable: (log) number of originations in (MSA)x(Year)x(Income) cells
(1) (2)
h = 0.02
(3) (4) (5) (6)
h = 0.04
(7) (8) (9) (10)
h = 0.06
I[R<80] 0.0255*** 0.0223***
(0.0077) (0.0085)
0.0318*** 0.0250***
(0.0052) (0.0055)
0.0061 0.0033
(0.0106) (0.0101)
-0.0112*** -0.0128***
(0.0032) (0.0037)
0.0314*** 0.0286*** 0.0183**
(0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0086)
0.0111 -0.0102 -0.0132
(0.0084) (0.0131) (0.0125)
-0.0067*** -0.0090*** -0.0223*** -0.0254***
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0069) (0.0074)
(R')*1[R<80] 0.0093** 0.0103**
(0.0045) (0.0051)
rect tri
R-Squared 0.968 0.978
N 5592 5476
rect tri rect tri
0.951 0.956 0.951 0.956
11257 11115 11257 11115
0.0089*** 0.0093***
(0.0024) (0.0029)
rect tri rect
0.0121 0.0119
(0.0097) (0.0107)
0.0027** 0.0034**
(0.0011) (0.0014)
-0.0047*** -0.0062***
(0.0016) (0.0020)
tri rect tri
0.945 0.949 0.946 0.949 0.946 0.949
16903 16721 16903 16721 16903 16721
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ** p<0.01. All regressions include MSA x Year fixed effects and dummy variables indicating for borrower income at
multiples of $5,000 and borrower income of $60,000. Loan volume has been log-transformed so coefficients should be interpretted as semi-elasticities.
(11) (12)
(R') 2 *1 [R<80]
Kernel
Weights
Table 4:
RD Estimates of CRA's Effect on Home Purchase Loans to LMI Borrowers, by Lender Type
Large MSA's, 1998-2002
Dependent variable: (log) number of originations in (MSA)x(Year)x(Income) cells
(9) (10)
h = 0.02 h = 0.04 h = 0.06
A. Banks (Regulated Lenders)
(loan volume at cutoff' = 24,082)
0.0740*** 0.0680***
(0.0169) (0.0192)
0.0541*** 0.0581*** 0.0632** 0.0679***
(0.0122) (0.0126) (0.0249) (0.0239)
275
0.0644*** 0.0655*** 0.0633** 0.0608**
(0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0313) (0.0297)
842 834 842 834
B. Mortgage Company Subsidiaries (Voluntarily Regulated Lenders)
(loan volume at cutoff' = 34,086)
0.0345** 0.0369**
(0.0147) (0.0165)
0.0216** 0.0252** 0.0322* 0.0332
(0.0093) (0.0105) (0.0195) (0.0203)
0.0241 0.0297* 0.0369 0.0321
(0.0159) (0.0162) (0.0247) (0.0246)
551 561 842 834 842 834
C. Independent Mortgage Companies (Unregulated Lenders)
0.0093 0.0197
(0.0160) (0.0176)
275
(loan volume at cutoff' = 35,767)
-0.0012 0.0037 0.0155 0.0204
(0.0105) (0.0116) (0.0216) (0.0220)
551 561
0.0058 0.0112 0.0250 0.0294
(0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0279) (0.0271)
842 834 842 834
Control Function
Kernal Weights
none
rect
none
tri
none
rect
none
tri
linear
rect
linear
tri
linear
rect
linear quadratic quadratic
rect
I[R<80]
I [R<80]
275
1[R<80]
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *" p<0.01. All regressions include MSA x Year fixed effects, dummy variable indicating for borrower income at multiples
of $5,000 and another dummy variable indicating for borrower income of $60,000. Loan volume has been log-transformed so coefficients should be interpretted as semi-elasticities. (1) loan
volume at cutoff estimated by calculating mean loan volume in MSA by year cells with R between 0.80 & 0.82 and then multiplying this mean by the number of MSA's (23) and years (5) in
the sample.
Table 5:
Characteristics of Applications Around CRA Cutoff w/ High & Low Predicted Denial Probability
Large MSA's, 2000
No. Applications
Proportion Applications Denied
Characteristics of Originated Applications
Number3
Borrower Income ($ 000's)
Amount-to-Income Ratio
1990 Med. House Value in Census Tract of
Purchased Property ($ 000's)
Race
Asian (Proportion)
Black
Hispanic
Other4
Applicant Sex
Female
NA - Internet/Mail Application
Co-Applicant Sex
Male
Female
NA - Mail/Internet Application
No Co-Applicant
FHA-Insured Loan
Loan Sold into Secondary Market 5
Applicationsi
92,779
0.187
(0.014)
67,506
60.64
(2.17)
2.20
(0.07)
204.06
(15.52)
0.074
(0.011)
0.075
(0.009)
0.117
(0.024)
0.098
(0.010)
0.298
(0.011)
0.054
(0.008)
0.058
(0.002)
0.362
(0.014)
0.028
(0.004)
0.552
(0.015)
0.097
(0.008)
0.518
(0.017)
(Predicted)
Highest Risk
Applications2
18,397
0.371
(0.021)
9,321
61.30
(2.33)
1.75
(0.14)
184.18
(15.74)
0.025
(0.006)
0.279
(0.046)
0.13
(0.018)
0.312
(0.036)
0.267
(0.013)
0.242
(0.032)
0.112
(0.013)
0.232
(0.018)
0.16
(0.023)
0.496
(0.035)
0.049
(0.014)
0.435
(0.020)
(Predicted)
Lowest Risk
Applications 2
18,389
0.085
(0.010)
15,708
60.50
(2.15)
2.49
(0.06)
249.27
(20.17)
0.119
(0.029)
0.014
(0.007)
0.037
(0.014)
0.016
(0.005)
0.415
(0.039)
0.004
(0.002)
0.012
(0.005)
0.376
(0.049)
0.001
(0.000)
0.611
(0.049)
0.228
(0.037)
0.62
(0.021)
Notes: Standard errors clustered at MSA-level in parentheses; dollar values adjusted to 2007 dollars using CPI-U. (1) Sample
includes home purchase applications from 2000 HMDA with BM between 70 & 90 in 23 largest MSA's. (2) Highest (lowest) risk
applications are those with predicted probability of denial in the top (bottom) 20%; see text for details on how denial probability is
predicted. (3) Number originated is less than the number not denied because some borrowers do not accept the lender's offer. (4)
'Other' comprised mostly of mail/internet applicants not reporting race (5) 'Loans Sold' not used to predict denial probability as it is
observed only for originated loans.
Table 6:
RD Estimates of CRA's Effect on Loan and
Large MSA's, 1998-2002
Borrower Characteristics
(9) (10)
h = 0.06
A. outcome: (log) Proportion of'High Risk' Loans'
(mean 2 just above cutoff = 0.14)
0.0170 0.0189
(0.0215) (0.0227)
281 275
0.0268* 0.0203 0.0040 -0.0023
(0.0161) (0.0163) (0.0321) (0.0307)
561 551
0.0333 0.0239 0.0091 -0.0144
(0.0255) (0.0252) (0.0398) (0.0389)
842 834 842 834
-0.0403** -0.0441**
(0.0180) (0.0189)
281 275
B. outcome: (lo,) Proportion of'Low Risk' Loansi
(mean 2 just above cutoff = 0.23)
-0.0357*** -0.0366*** -0.0306 -0.0268
(0.0119) (0.0132) (0.0257) (0.0252)
-0.0414** -0.0337* -0.0153 -0.0051
(0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0313) (0.0313)
842 834 842 834
C. outcome: (log) Proportion of Loans Sold into Secondary Market
(mean2just above cutoff = 0.53)
-0.0417*** -0.0430***
(0.0095) (0.0111)
281 275
Control Function
Kernal Weights
none
rect
none
tri
-0.0387*** -0.0383*** -0.0416*** -0.0428***
(0.0068) (0.0072) (0.0136) (0.0137)
561
none
rect
551
none
tri
561
linear
rect
551
linear
tri
-0.0396*** -0.0382*** -0.0301* -0.0426***
(0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0161) (0.0164)
842 834 842 834
linear
rect
linear quadratic quadratic
rect
h = 0.02
1 [R<80]
h = 0.04
1[R<80]
I[R<801
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include MSA x Year fixed effects, dummy variable indicating for borrower income at multiples
of $5,000 and another dummy variable indicating for borrower income of $60,000. (1) Loan risk estimated as the predicted liklihood of application denial given borrower and loan
characteristics. High (low) risk loans represent those in the upper (lower) 20% of the estimated 'risk' distribution. See text for more details. (2) Means calculated using MSA by year cells
with R between 0.80 & 0.82.
Table 7:
RD Estimates of CRA's Effect on Home Purchase Loans to LMI Borrowers, Inside and Outside GSE-Qualified Census Tracts
Large MSA's, 1998-2002
Dependent variable: (log) number of originations in (MSA)x(Year)x(Income) cells
(9) (10)
h = 0.02 h = 0.04 h = 0.06
A. Sample: Loans Inside GSE-qualified Census Tracts
(loan volume at cutoff' = 4,106)
0.0763*** 0.0692**
(0.0269) (0.0301)
281 275
0.1009*** 0.0782*** 0.0161 0.0221
(0.0191) (0.0199) (0.0387) (0.0379)
561 551
0.0472 0.0304 0.0098 0.0058
(0.0309) (0.0307) (0.0483) (0.0471)
842 834 842 834
B. Sample: Loans Outside of GSE-qualified Census Tracts
(loan volume at cutoff4 = 21,379)
0.0667*** 0.0613***
(0.0173) (0.0190)
281 275
0.0405*** 0.0488*** 0.0655** 0.0701***
(0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0255) (0.0242)
561 551
0.0640*** 0.0666*** 0.0658** 0.0653**
(0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0319) (0.0300)
842 834 842 834
Control Function
Kernal Weights
none
rect
none
tri
none
rect
none
tri
linear
rect
linear
tri
linear
rect
linear quadratic quadratic
rect
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *" p<0.01. All regressions include MSA x Year fixed effects, dummy variable indicating for borrower income at multiples
of $5,000 and another dummy variable indicating for borrower income of $60,000. Loan volume has been log-transformed so coefficients should be interpretted as semi-elasticities. (1) Loan
volume at cutoff estimated by calculating mean loan volume in MSA by year cells with R between 0.80 & 0.82 and then multiplying this mean by the number of MSA's (23) and years (5) in
the sample.
1[R<80]
1[R<80]
Table 8:
RD Estimates
Large MSA's,
of CRA's Effect on Application Volume and Dollars Originated
1998-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
h = 0.02 h = 0.04
(8) (9) (10)
h = 0.06
0.06
(0.0
5
A. outcome: (log) # Applications at Banks
(loan volume at cutoff' = 34,177)
16*** 0.0630** 0.0713*** 0
129) (0.0251) (0.0242)
51 561 551
.0589***
(0.0206)
842
B. outcome: (log) # Applications at Mortgage Company Subsidiaries
(loan volume at cutoff' = 44,953)
56** 0.0283** 0.0332 0.0382* 0.0206
102) (0.0116) (0.0217) (0.0224) (0.0175)
61 551 561 551 842
C. outcome: (log) Dollars Originated by Banks
(dollars lent at cutoffW = $3.3 billion)
0.0369*** 0.0597** 0.0664*** 0.0613***
(0.0132) (0.0259) (0.0250) (0.0207)
551 561 551 842
0.0648***
(0.0202)
834
0.0290
(0.0181)
834
0.0611***
(0.0205)
834
D. outcome: (log) Dollors Originated by Mortgage Companies Subsidiaries
(dollars lent just above cutoff' = $5.1 billion)
-0.0089 0.0075 0.0421** 0.0375* 0.0280* 0.0353**
0.0096) (0.0106) (0.0194) (0.0202) (0.0160) (0.0161)
551 561 551
0.0681**
(0.0321)
842
0.0395
(0.0275)
842
0.0583*
(0.0322)
842
0.0439*
(0.0243)
842 834 842
Control Function
Kernal Weights
none none
rect tri
none none linear linear
rect tri rect tri
linear
rect
linear quadratic quadratic
rect tri
1[R<80]
N
I [R<80)
N
0.0580***
(0.0125)
561
0.0795***
(0.0173)
281
0.0395**
(0.0161)
281
0.0753***
(0.0194)
275
0.0418**
(0.0186)
275
0.02
(0.0
5
1[R<80]
N
1[R<80]
N
0.0253**
(0.0127)
561
0.0604***
(0.0178)
281
0.0245*
(0.0147)
281
0.0557***
(0.0205)
275
0.0291*
(0.0164)
275
0.0647**
(0.0300)
834
0.0388
(0.0272)
834
0.0592*
(0.0306)
834
0.0341
(0.0241)
834
(
561
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include MSA x Year fixed effects, dummy variable indicating for borrower income at multiples
of $5,000 and another dummy variable indicating for borrower income of $60,000. (1) Volumes estimated by calculating mean loan volume in MSA by year cells with R between 0.80 & 0.82
and then multiplying this mean by the number of MSA's (23) and years (5) in the sample. Dollar amounts adjusted to $2007 using CPI-U.
(
Chapter 3
Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effects
of the GSE Act of 1992
3.1. Introduction
Congress created Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to facilitate the primary mortgage
market by connecting distant borrowers and investors. Although the two institutions
have been reconstituted into private "government-sponsored enterprises" (GSEs), they
retain implicit and explicit financial benefits from the government (CBO 2001). One of
the justifications for these benefits is that they will be passed on to consumers in the form
of lower mortgage interest rates. Published estimates typically imply the GSEs lower
mortgage rates by 30 to 50 basis points'. However, a recent working paper by Sherlund
(2008) suggests the GSE impact has fallen considerably since 1996. And work by
Passmore et al (2005) suggests that only a small fraction of the financial benefits accruing
to the GSEs are passed through to borrowers.
The GSEs are also expected to help promote homeownership opportunities for
low-income households and neighborhoods, as well as minority households and
communities. The 1992 Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and Soundness Act
(hereafter the GSE Act) formalizes this responsibility. The GSE Act mandates that the
US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) create "affordable housing
goals" that the GSEs must meet. These goals, adjusted periodically, specify that a certain
fraction of GSE mortgage purchases must be of loans made to targeted households and
neighborhoods.
The GSE Act is one of many local and federal government programs and
mandates intended to increase credit access and homeownership. One factor motivating
these policies are sociological and economic theories suggesting that credit access and
homeownership generate positive externalities such as reduced crime, improved child
outcomes, increased investment in local public goods and increased voter turnout 2
These policies have also been motivated as ways to help overcome apparent
market failures such as racial discrimination (e.g. Munnell et al 1996). Another often
cited market imperfection is that some of the information lenders use to price mortgages
is a public good and so there may be underinvestment in information by lenders resulting
in suboptimal credit supply (Lang and Nakamura 1993). Lang and Nakamura argue, for
instance, that a positive shock to credit supply that increases neighborhood home sales
may generate public information about local home values that leads to a higher level of
credit supply in equilibrium. Bhutta (2008) provides some evidence for this hypothesis.
In that paper, I show that the Community Reinvestment Act not only pushes regulated
lenders (banks) to increase their lending in targeted low-income neighborhoods, but also
' See Quigley (2006) for a review of this literature
2 See Kubrin and Squires for an example from the sociology literature. See Haurin et al (2003) for a review
of the economics literature.
leads to an increase in lending by unregulated lenders (independent mortgage companies)
in some targeted neighborhoods - specifically, those areas that have had relatively low
loan volume in the recent past, consistent with an information spillover story.
Several studies have documented positive trends in GSE purchases of loans from
targeted groups over time. Figure 1 shows how the three affordable housing goals
created by HUD have changed over time and each of the GSEs' corresponding purchase
shares over time.3 The initial goals (thick black line) were finalized in December 1995,
then were increased in 1997 and then again in 2001 and 2005. Numbers generated from
analyses by Manchester (2002, 2007) of GSE data are also shown in Figure 1 and suggest
that the GSEs have been raising their share of purchases towards the target populations.
However, Figure 1 (and much of the literature regarding the GSE Act and GSE
activity) does not indicate whether the affordable housing goals have actually forced the
GSEs to behave differently than they would in the absence of the Act. In this paper, I use
comprehensive mortgage application data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) and test whether the "Underserved Areas" goal (top panel of Figure 1),
which targets relatively low-income neighborhoods, has a causal impact on GSE
purchase activity and subsequent mortgage credit flow in targeted neighborhoods.4
Under this goal, a purchased loan counts towards the GSEs' goal if the loan is for an
owner-occupied property in a census tract that has a median family income less than or
equal to 90% of the MSA median family income.5 I exploit this discontinuity in the
selection rule to identify the impact of the housing goal, in essence comparing GSE
purchase volume and overall loan volume in tracts just below the 90% cutoff to that in
tracts just above the cutoff. More precisely, I employ local nonparametric and semi-
parametric regression discontinuity methods similar to those described in Porter (2003)
and Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and implemented in Ludwig and Miller's (2007) study
of Head Start.
Discerning the causal effect of the GSE goals on GSE behavior and overall credit
flow is important for several reasons. For one, knowing the degree to which the goals
bind can help policy makers as they reset goals in the future. Policy makers should also
be interested in whether increased GSE purchasing activity ultimately affects the
mortgage supply. One reason the affordable housing goals would have no impact is if
increased GSE purchase activity in targeted census tracts crowded out non-GSE
purchasers. Another reason, proposed by An and Bostic (2008, 2006), is that the
increased supply of GSE funds in targeted neighborhoods may draw the highest quality
FHA and subprime applicants into conventional, conforming loans (still, a boon to
consumer welfare, the authors note).
Finally, identifying and quantifying the GSE Act's effects can provide insight into
the role the Act played, as opposed to market forces and other public policies, in the
surge in homeownership and household mortgage debt since the mid-1990's. While the
homeownership rate and household mortgage debt grew sharply in the years following
3 See notes underneath Figure 1 for description of GSE housing goals
4 Ongoing work analyzes the effects of the other goals.
' The Underserved Areas Goal also targets low and moderate income, predominantly minority
neighborhoods: census tracts where minorities make up at least 30% of the population and median family
income is no greater 120% of the MSA median family income. Ongoing research by the author exploits
this discontinuity as well as the discontinuity in the other two Affordable Housing Goals to more
thoroughly evaluate the GSE Act's impact.
passage of the GSE Act, a number of other policy, regulatory and (supply side) market
changes could have driven these trends as well (Li 2005). From the late 1980's to mid
1990's, Congress strengthened HMDA, helping regulators and consumer advocates
detect discrimination by mortgage lenders, as well as the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA), which forces banks to provide evidence that they are supplying credit in low-
income neighborhoods and low-income households. At the same time, information
technology improvements greatly reduced the cost of mortgage lending during the 1990's
and improved the ability of mortgage lenders to price risk, which is important for
subprime lending (see Straka 2000).
Only a few papers test for causal effects of the GSE Act. Ambrose and
Thibodeau (2003) try to estimate the impact of the GSE Act on credit supply using a
credit supply-demand model that assumes price increases indicate excess demand (loan
volume is on the supply curve) and vice versa. They conclude that the GSE Act has had
little impact based on their finding that there is only a small (positive) relationship
between MSA loan volume and the MSA population share living in GSE targeted census
tracts. However, it is possible that their results are biased downward as this regressor is
likely negatively correlated with many MSA-level socio-economic characteristics that
predict mortgage volume.6
Bostic and Gabriel (2006) estimate the impact of being a GSE-targeted census
tract on tract housing outcomes (e.g. median home value) in California using the 2000
Census. Similar to the identification strategy in this paper, they take advantage of the
discontinuous eligibility rule, comparing outcomes for tracts within ten percentage points
below the cutoff to those within the same distance above the cutoff.7 They do not find
evidence of a treatment effect, but the interval they use is large and they do not control
for the "assignment variable" (i.e. tract to MSA median family income ratio). As the
results in this paper will show, such a strategy can lead to severe bias despite controlling
for many other covariates.
Finally, An and Bostic (2008, 2006) test whether increased GSE activity in
targeted tracts crowds out FHA and subprime lending, motivating their study as an
exploration of one reason the GSE Act appears to have had a limited impact on real
outcomes as in Bostic and Gabriel above. In these two papers, their outcomes of interest
are the change (between 1996 and 2000) in FHA and subprime shares of total tract
originations, respectively. They regress these variables on the change in GSE share of
originations.8 Further, they propose instrumenting this regressor with a variable
indicating for being a GSE-targeted census tract. Similar to Bostic and Gabriel's study
described above, An and Bostic's main regressions use tracts within ten percentage points
of the 90% cutoff, and again they do not control for the assignment variable.
Although they find no "first-stage" effect, they still find statistically significant
negative second-stage relationships between GSE share and the two outcome variables.
This result may occur because they do not execute a standard instrumental variable
6 Another slight criticism of their study is that it spans 1995 to 1998 despite 1995 being a "transition
period" year when goal levels were quite low and the definition of"underserved census tract" differed from
that for years after 1995.
7 An et al (2007) show results of the same set of tests for the nation as a whole. They also fail to find any
impact in targeted tracts.
8 GSEs typically purchase conventional, conforming loans and not government-insured loans (i.e. FHA and
VA) or subprime loans. See Table 2.
regression and therefore may actually be capturing the cross-sectional relationship one
would expect (i.e. tracts with more prime loans purchased by the GSEs will tend to have
fewer subprime loans).9
Regardless of these potential shortcomings, looking at loan shares may generate
misleading results as well. Take for example (1.1) below, which regresses tract-level
FHA loan share on tract-level GSE-purchased loan share (a la An and Bostic, 2008):
GSE-Ineligible + GSE-Eligible GSE-Ineligible + GSE-Eligible +
Instrumenting the GSE-purchase share variable with a treatment dummy is not valid since
the treatment may affect GSE-Eligible (indeed, the ultimate goal of the Act is to increase
overall credit flow), which enters in the dependent variable. As such one cannot interpret
a negative estimate of f as evidence that FHA lending falls in response to increased GSE
purchase activity as An and Bostic do.
In contrast to An and Bostic, I estimate separately the impact of the Underserved
Areas Goal (UAG) of the GSE Act on (1) the number of GSE purchases, (2) the total
number of GSE-eligible originations and (3) the number of GSE-ineligible loans in
targeted tracts. I also use data for all years between 1994 and 2002 in order to generate
more precise estimates and because 2001 and 2002 follow a sharp increase in the UAG
level. And, as mentioned before, I implement local regression discontinuity methods
described by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) to help mitigate identification concerns.
To preview, I find evidence of a direct effect of the UAG on GSE purchasing
activity of 3-4% and evidence of a increase in overall GSE-eligible lending of 2-3%. At
the same time, I find no evidence of a reduction in "GSE-ineligible" lending, which is
comprised mainly of FHA and subprime loans (see Section 2.2).
These results are similar for different bandwidths and control function
specifications. I also find that the relationship between GSE-eligible loan volume and the
assignment variable (conditional on covariates) is generally smooth - that is, I find
almost no other discontinuities at points away from the cutoff.
It is important to note that the results for GSE purchases and GSE-eligible lending
just mentioned are conditional on tract-level covariates, including a lagged ("pre-
treatment") value of the outcome variable. Baseline regression discontinuity estimates
excluding covariates are in general slightly smaller and not statistically significant.
In the next section, I discuss the data used in this paper and the regression
discontinuity empirical strategy, and then present summary statistics. Section 3 describes
the results and Section 4 summarizes and discusses directions for future research.
' To be specific, An and Bostic generate predicted GSE share in a first stage equation, and use these
predicted values in a second stage equation where the outcome variable is either FHA loan share or
subprime loan share, but they do not appear to include the same set of covariates that they used in the first
stage regression.
3.2. Data & Empirical Strategy
3.2.1. Overview
I take advantage of a sharp discontinuity in the GSE Underserved Areas Housing
Goal (UAG) eligibility rule to identify the goal's impact on GSE purchase volume and
overall credit flow. Since 1996, the GSEs have been required to make a specified share
of their mortgage purchases for loans originated in 'underserved neighborhoods' (see top
panel of Figure 1). Census tracts with a median family income no greater than 90% of
MSA median family income qualify as 'underserved neighborhoods'. In the regression
discontinuity (RD) analysis that follows, this ratio of tract median family income to MSA
median family income is the "assignment" (or "running") variable and is referred to as
TM. Therefore, census tracts with TM < 0.90 are targeted by the GSEs and the impact of
the UAG at the cutoff will be identified by measuring the jump in purchase and loan
volume at TM= 0.90.
Tract and MSA median family income are based on decennial Census income
data and MSA definitions, which change periodically. Between 1994 and 2002 almost all
census tracts had a constant value of TM based on the 1990 Census and 1993 MSA
definitions (by OMB). 10 Importantly, the value of TM used in this paper is identical to
that used by the GSEs and HUD. As such, the key right-hand-side variable in the
regressions to follow is measured without error.
3.2.2. Data & Summary Statistics
Data on census tract level mortgage activity comes from information submitted by
lenders under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA 1977). Since 1990, lenders
covered by HMDA have been required to compile and submit detailed information on the
individual mortgage applications they receive. And in 1993 HMDA started including a
large number of independent mortgage companies previously exempt from HMDA
reporting. 11
A number of variables available in the HMDA will be important to this analysis.
One is the census tract of the loan: for each loan application lenders are asked to report
the census tract of the property. 12 HMDA also provides a unique lender ID, which I will
combine with data from HUD to identify loans in HMDA as being originated by lenders
that specialize in subprime lending. 13 Other loan-level variables I will use are the loan
amount, the disposition of the loan (e.g. approved, originated, denied, etc.), the loan
purpose (e.g. refinance) and the type of loan (e.g. FHA, VA or conventional). Finally,
lenders also report whether the loan was purchased and to whom it was sold, including
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This variable will be used to count up and compare the
number of GSE-purchased loans in targeted versus not-targeted tracts. See Table 1 for a
full list and description of the variables available in HMDA.
0o The exception is tracts that are part of the few newly formed MSAs between 1994 and 2002. I only use
tracts that are in the 1993 set of MSAs.
11 See Avery et al (2007) for more details on HMDA data. Also see FFIEC website (www.ffiec.gov) for
rules defining which lending institutions are required to report under HMDA.
12 See Avery et al (2007) for details and reliability of geographic reporting requirements. 1990 census tract
definitions apply to HMDA data between 1992 and 2002, and 2000 census tract definitions have been used
since 2003.
13 Each year, HUD releases a "subprime lender list". See www.huduser.org .
Census tract-level characteristics from the 1990 Census, compiled and distributed
by Geolytics, will also be used. These characteristics will be merged to the HMDA loan
data using the 1990 census tract code to create a tract-level dataset with yearly mortgage
activity variables from HMDA and tract demographic and housing characteristics from
the Census.
Although the GSE Act covers rural and urban areas, the analysis focuses on
census tracts in MSAs as HMDA data are unreliable in rural areas (Avery et al 2007). 1
also exclude census tracts in MSAs in Hawaii and Alaska as well as those in MSAs
formed between 1993 and 1999 in order to maintain a constant set of geographies for the
period under study, 1997-2002. Census tract and MSA definitions changed in 2003 and
2004, respectively, which necessitates a separate study of the GSE Act using HMDA data
in years after 2002.
Some outlier census tracts were dropped as well. Those with fewer than 100
housing units, those with zero "specified" owner-occupied units, those with more than
30% of the population living in group quarters and those with fewer than one home
purchase or refinance origination per (1990) owner-occupied between 1997 and 2002 or
more than ten originations per (1990) owner-occupied unit between 1997 and 2002 were
dropped. In the vicinity of the GSE-eligibility cutoff (i.e. the census tracts of interest for
the regression discontinuity design described below), just over 97% of census tracts are
retained in the sample.
Table 2 provides means of tract-level mortgage activity and tract characteristics.
Panel A shows average mortgage volume between 1997 and 2002. Column 1 provides
means and standard deviations for all tracts that meet the sample selection criteria.
Columns 2 and 3 provide means and standard deviations for tracts just below and above
the UAG cutoff, respectively, and column 4 provides the p-Value for a test of the equality
of the means in columns 2 and 3. The top row of Panel A shows total refinance and
home purchase, owner-occupied originations. Tracts around the cutoff had loan volume
below the average, while those just above the cutoff had about 8% more than those just
below.
The second row of Panel A provides the number of "GSE-eligible" originations
per tract. GSE-eligible originations are those with loan amounts within the conforming
loan limit set by Congress, are conventional (i.e. not FHA or VA insured), and are not
originated by a subprime lender as defined by HUD. Eligible loans account for about
two-thirds of the market, while the number of eligible loans in just-targeted tracts is about
10% lower relative to just-not-targeted tracts. These figures also show that the GSEs
purchase about two-thirds of the eligible loans that are purchased. About one-third of
loans are not purchased in the year that they are originated. If these loans are sold in later
years - called 'seasoned' loans - they will not generally be reported in HMDA. As such,
HMDA does not account for all GSE purchase activity (see Scheessele 1998).
In terms of "GSE-ineligible" loans, almost none of these are purchased by the
GSEs. The majority of these loans are high-priced, high-risk FHA and subprime loans,
while the rest are VA and "jumbo" loans. The few ineligible loans purchased by the
GSEs may be attributed to reporting error and to the fact that identifying eligible loans in
the HMDA data is not perfect - for instance, subprime lenders may make prime loans and
vice versa.14 Interestingly, in contrast to the case for eligible loans there is no statistical
difference in ineligible lending for the two groups around the cutoff.
Panel B shows tract averages of housing and demographic characteristics
measured in the 1990 Census. Similar to the pattern for overall origination volume, the
number of owner-occupied housing units is significantly lower in GSE-targeted tracts
relative to those not targeted, but the difference (5%) is not as great as the difference in
loan volume (8%). At the same time, tract-size is not substantively different across the
cutoff (second row), which is not surprising since tracts are designed to be of similar size.
Most of the other housing and demographic characteristics are (statistically)
significantly different across the cutoff. These results suggest that these two groups of
tracts are not similar despite their being relatively near the cutoff. In other words, tract
characteristics appear to change quickly with the running variable, TM. As such, it will
be important to employ a strategy that will adequately control for these differences.
3.2.3. Empirical Strategy: Regression Discontinuity
Consider the following tract-level regression of potential outcomes such as
mortgage origination volume on a treatment indicator variable, Di = 1 [TM, 5 0.90]:
(2.1) Y = a + 8D, + e,
The following expression captures the intuition behind the regression discontinuity
design:
(2.2) lim{E[e, 10.90 - h < TM, < 0.90] - E[e, 0.90 < TM, < 0.90 + h]} = 0h-40
(2.2) implies that GSE targeted and not-targeted tracts arbitrarily close to the cutoff (TM
= 0.90) are identical in expectation with the exception of their eligibility status. As such,
any substantive difference in outcomes across the cutoff for tracts 'near' the cutoff can be
attributed to a GSE treatment effect.
With that in mind, a natural approach to estimating / is to simply compare the
mean of Yi for tracts "just below" the cutoff to that for tracts "just above" the cutoff. This
can be done in a single regression as in (2.1), weighting observations with kernel weights
Wi = K([TM, - 0.90]/h), where h is some chosen bandwidth. I will show estimates using
both a simple rectangular kernel (K(a) = 1[05 IalS 1] ) as well as a triangular kernel (
K(a) = 1[0 ljal 1 ]*[1-jal ] ) that gives the most weight to tracts closest to the cutoff.
Porter (2003) shows that the bias of this nonparametric approach increases (for a
given h) in the slope of the relationship between the outcome and running variables.
More concretely, since mortgage activity is negatively correlated with tract income (see
Table 2) nonparametric estimates of/f from will be downward biased (i.e. against finding
a positive impact of the UAG). I try to mitigate this bias by using a small bandwidth (h =
0.02), triangular kernel weights and adding tract-level covariates into the regression,
including a lagged ('pretreatment') value of the outcome variable.
14 Overall, though, mortgage lenders tend to specialize in either prime or subprime lending. (see Nichols et
al 2005)
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2007), I also perform local linear regression to
estimate f. This strategy allows one to use data further away from the cutoff by
controlling for the slope of the relationship between the outcome and assignment
variables on either side of the cutoff. Simply stated, in this approach I fit a line to the
data within a distance h on either side of the cutoff and fi is calculated as the difference
between the intercepts of these two estimated lines. This will be done in a single, kernel
weighted regression:
(2.3) = a+D, + TM',+ TM ',* 1[TM, < 0.90]+ ,u
where TM', = TM, -0.90. The term TM',+ TM' * 1[TM, < 0.90] in (2.3) is often referred
to as the "control function". For all regressions, robust standard errors clustered at the
MSA level are reported.
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Preliminaries: Testing the Identification Assumption
The RD identification assumption is that all tract characteristics affecting tract
loan volume change smoothly across the cutoff except for tract eligibility status, which
changes sharply at the cutoff. Although this assumption is not fully testable, one may be
more confident it holds if observable ('pre-treatment') tract characteristics change
smoothly across the cutoff.
Figure 2 suggests that observable tract characteristics change smoothly across the
cutoff. Figure 2 plots the predicted values from a regression of the (log) number of tract
originations between 1997 and 2002 on the set of tract characteristics listed in Panel B of
Table 2, with the exception that I log-transform the number of owner-occupied units,
total number of housing units and median home value before entering them into the
regression. The regression also includes MSA fixed effects but the estimated fixed
effects are not used to generate the predicted values.
Each data point shown in Figure 2 represents a mean predicted value for tracts in
a one percentage point interval of TM. Also shown are local linear regression estimated
lines on either side of the cutoff. These fitted lines are estimated using the underlying
tract-level predicted values. The two lines meet close to each other at the cutoff,
indicating that the set of tract characteristics used in the regression do not change
discretely at the cutoff since the tract characteristics just to the left of the cutoff predict
nearly same volume of loans as the tract characteristics just to the right of the cutoff
(conditional on MSA).
3.3.2. Effects on Secondary Market Purchasing Activity
Figure 3 illustrates the basic idea of the RD design, and suggests that the effect of
the UAG on GSE purchase activity is small (in percentage terms). Figure 3 is analogous
to Figure 2, except that the Y-axis variable in this case is (log) GSE-purchases of
originations that are eligible for GSE purchase per (1990) owner-occupied unit. The gap
between the two lines implies an effect at the cutoff of less than 5%.
Table 3 provides local linear regression and nonparametric RD estimates of the
effect of the UAG on GSE purchase activity between 1997 and 2002. In all the
regressions, I include MSA fixed effects so that the discontinuity is identified only from
variation across the cutoff within MSAs. I also control for two tract scale variables -
(log) number of owner-occupied units and (log) total housing units, both measured in
1990. Columns 1-7 show estimates using a bandwidth of five percentage points, while
columns 8-11 show estimates using a bandwidth of two percentage points.
The point estimate in column 1 basically provides the difference in mean GSE
purchase activity across the cutoff after adjusting for tract size and MSA, and shows the
GSEs purchase about 10% fewer loans in tracts with TM between 85 and 90 relative to
those between 90 and 95. Even after adjusting for the remainder of the covariates listed
in Table 2, the GSEs purchase about 3% fewer loans (column 2).
Column 3 institutes the local linear approach described earlier, controlling only
for MSA and tract size. The coefficient on TM is significant and the discontinuity
estimate now is positive (1.5%) though not statistically different from zero. The results
of the first three columns illustrate the difficulties of a strategy that tries to identify the
GSE effect simply by controlling for observables.
In column 4 I add in the set of covariates used in column 2. Under the
assumptions (2.2) and that the linear TM terms correctly control for the trend in GSE
purchases on either side of the cutoff, covariates are not needed in theory to identify the
discontinuity and including covariates might be viewed as deviating from the spirit of the
quasi-experimental RD design. But including covariates can improve precision and help
correct small sample bias in the basic specification (Imbens and Lemieux 2007). Of
course, if the inclusion of covariates results in "large" differences in the point estimates,
one might be concerned that the identification assumption (2.2) does not hold. But
Figure 2 suggests this should not be the case. The standard error in column 4 does fall
and the point estimate rises only slightly in absolute terms - about 0.007 - again
suggesting that observables change quite smoothly across the cutoff.
In column 5 I include the (log) number of GSE-purchases between 1994 and 1996
as a regressor that will control for unobservable tract characteristics and likely improve
the precision of the estimates further. I consider 1994-1996 a 'pre-treatment' period as
these years come before the goal level increases in 1997 and 2001. Nevertheless, if the
GSEs responded to knowledge of the future goals during these early years, then including
this lagged value will net out this earlier impact.
The estimate (standard error) in column 5 is about 0.031 (0.017). While
marginally significant, I view this result with some caution as the point estimate has now
roughly doubled relative to the baseline specification in column 3. On the other hand, the
absolute value of the difference between the point estimates in columns 3 and 5 is small -
about 0.015.
Columns 6 and 7 use triangular kernel weights. These estimates are slightly
larger than those using rectangular weights. And again, including the lagged value
reduces the standard error considerably. These estimates suggest a discontinuity in GSE-
purchase volume of just under 4%.
Columns 8-11 show nonparametric estimates (in the sense that they do not include
linear controls for TM) and the bandwidth (h) is cut to 0.02. Columns 8 and 9 use
rectangular weights while 10 and 11 use triangular weights. The column 8 specification
is analogous to that in column 2. These estimates are similar in magnitude to those
discussed earlier and the specifications that include the lag (columns 9 and 11) are
statistically significant. 15
Overall, Table 2 provides evidence of a 3-4% effect of the UAG on GSE purchase
activity at the cutoff, although this is conditional on including tract covariates. Next, I
look for evidence of whether increased GSE purchase activity in targeted tracts crowds
out non-GSE purchases of GSE-eligible originations in targeted tracts.
Table 4 provides estimates of the discontinuity in non-GSE purchase activity in
targeted tracts. The eight specifications in Table 4 correspond to the specifications in
columns 4-11 in Table 3. Table 4 provides no evidence of crowd out. On the contrary
some of the point estimates, in particular those specifications controlling for a lag of the
outcome variable, are similar in magnitude to those in Table 3 although only one of the
estimates is statistically significant. One reason that non-GSE purchases might increase
in targeted tracts is that GSE-eligible mortgages in these areas now represent more liquid
assets because of the UAG and so may be more attractive to non-GSE secondary market
participants.
Reporting error by HMDA respondents is another reason non-GSE purchases
might appear to increase. In particular, the purchaser variable may be reported with
considerable error (Scheesele 1998). If lenders do not accurately report to whom they
sell their loans, and if the UAG does in fact lead to an increase in credit flow, this
combination could result in an observed increase in non-GSE purchases that simply
reflects the underlying expansion in GSE-eligible credit flow.
3.3.3. Effect on Overall Credit Flow
The ultimate objective of the GSE Act is to increase credit flow to targeted
groups. Instead of looking at direct purchases by the GSEs, I now look at the effect of
the UAG on all GSE-eligible originations between 1997 and 2002 (3rd row of Table 2).
To be more concise, I show only the specifications corresponding to those in columns 5,
6 and 8 in Table 4. Other specifications shown earlier generate similar results for the
outcome variables in the tables to follow. The estimates in Table 5 follow a pattern
similar to those in Tables 3 and 4. In particular, including the lag as an independent
variable yields a slightly higher and statistically significant estimate of about 2.7% that is
robust to using a triangular kernel (column 3).
One useful exercise is to show discontinuity estimates at points other than TM =
0.90. If the same specification(s) yields significant discontinuities elsewhere, that would
indicate that the discontinuity found at TM = 0.90 may be spurious. Figure 4 shows
estimated discontinuities in (log) GSE-eligible originations using the specification in
column 2 from Table 5 (i.e. h = 0.02, no control function used and includes the lag) at 30
different values of TM between 0.75 and 1.05. Other than the discontinuity at 0.90, there
is only a negative discontinuity at 0.88 and a positive discontinuity at 0.81. The
discontinuity at 0.88 is likely related to the discontinuity at 0.90. This estimate represents
the conditional mean for tracts in the TM interval [86, 88] relative to that in the interval
(88, 90] and therefore suggests the treatment effect may be concentrated in tracts right
near the cutoff. There is no clear reason for a discontinuity at 0.81, but when testing for a
discontinuity at so many values, it should not be surprising in a statistical sense to find at
least one significant jump. Overall, Figure 4 suggests the empirical relationship between
15 The point estimates in columns 9 and 11 rise slightly with the inclusion a linear control function.
loan volume and TM is smooth and that the discontinuity at 0.90 is not likely to be
spurious.
Table 6 breaks the estimates of Table 5 into three two-year period estimates. The
results suggest that the UAG was not binding until the 1999-2000 period, and that the
discontinuity just before and after the sharp increase in the UAG level from 24% to 31%
was basically the same. That the discontinuity is similar before and after the 2001 change
is surprising. Perhaps expectations of a substantive increase in the UAG level led to an
anticipatory adjustment prior to the actual enactment. But the new goal levels were
released in October, 2000 and I have not found evidence of considerable public debate
about raising the goal level prior to that date.
The results thus far suggest two reasons why one might fail to find substantive
differences in housing outcomes across the cutoff measured in the 2000 Census as in
Bostic and Gabriel's (2006) previously mentioned study. One is simply that the
measured effects are fairly small. And two, these effects do not show up until the 1999-
2000 period, while the 2000 Census measures outcomes in April of 2000.
3.3.4. Testing for Crowd-out of Subprime and FHA Loans
As hypothesized in two papers by An and Bostic (2006, 2008), if prime lenders
are more aggressive in pursuing applicants in targeted areas they may attract the highest
quality FHA and subprime applicants. Along these lines, other research suggests that
many borrowers that obtain high cost FHA or subprime loans likely could have qualified
for a prime loan (e.g. Pennington-Cross et al 2000, Temkin et al 2002). Alternatively,
new GSE flexible lending programs could also crowd-out FHA and subprime lenders (see
Quercia et al 2002). As An and Bostic argue, while these dynamic interactions might
limit the impact of the GSE Act on aggregate credit flow or even reduce total flow, it may
improve consumer welfare by helping get borrowers into cheaper mortgage contracts.
In Table 7 I test for crowd-out by estimating the discontinuity in GSE-ineligible
lending, which consists primarily of FHA loans and loans by subprime lenders (as
determined by HUD). Also included in this set of loans are VA loans and loans that are
above the conforming loan amount limit ('jumbo' loans). Table 7 provides no evidence
of crowd-out as argued by An and Bostic. In fact, all of the point estimates are positive,
but relatively small (about 1%) and statistically insignificant.' 6
3.4. Summary & Discussion
In this paper, I identify the impact of the Underserved Areas Goal established
under the GSE Act by taking advantage of a discontinuity in the census tract eligibility
rule.
I find that this goal has a direct effect on GSE purchasing activity of 3-4% and
increases overall GSE-eligible originations by 2-3%. Unlike previous research, I find no
evidence of an offsetting reduction in "GSE-ineligible" lending, which is comprised
mainly of FHA and subprime loans. At the same time, that FHA and subprime lending
does not increase bolsters the view that the discontinuity in GSE-eligible lending is not
spurious. Additionally, the lack of discontinuities at points away from the cutoff (Figure
4) also supports the causal interpretation of the cutoff. One possible weakness of the
16 The results are essentially identical when focusing just on loans originated between 1999 and 2002, the
years when the discontinuity in GSE-eligible lending is largest (see Table 6).
results, however, is that they depend on including covariates and thus deviate from a
"true" RD design.
An interesting remaining question is if increased GSE activity is not coming at the
expense of FHA and subprime lenders, to whom (i.e. where in the risk distribution) are
these loans going? Ongoing research using the limited borrower characteristics from the
HMDA and more detailed data from the GSEs will try to answer this question, although
the small effects measured here suggests that finding sharp changes in borrower risk
across the cutoff may be difficult.
Also in terms of future research, one could exploit the discontinuities and
temporal changes in the other GSE goals to evaluate the impact they have had and get a
broader sense of the impact the GSE Act has had.
One important limitation of the regression discontinuity strategy is that it only
identifies the goal's impact at the eligibility cutoff. The results in this paper say little
about the UAG's effect on census tracts away from the cutoff. This limitation is
countered by the credibility of the regression discontinuity design and the ability to easily
identify general equilibrium effects (e.g. crowd-out) within this framework.
The 2.7% estimated effect on GSE-eligible lending (Table 5) translates into about
18 extra home purchase and refinance originations, or about $2.2 million (in 2007
dollars) in credit, per tract at the cutoff.17 Applying this number to the roughly 1100
sample tracts just below the cutoff establishes a lower bound on the aggregate impact of
the UAG of about $2.4 billion. This value appears to be considerably smaller than the
subsidy the GSEs maintain, which CBO (2001) estimated at over $12 billion (in 2007
dollars) in 2000 alone.
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Figure 1:
GSE Housing Goals and Performance
Underserved Areas Goal
Year
Low and Moderate Income Goal
1997 2001
Year
Special Affordable Goal
1997 2001
Year
----- . Fannie Mae
Goal
--- Freddie Mac
Source: Manchester 2002, 2007
Notes: The "Underserved Areas" goal targets GSE purchases in low-income & minority neighborhoods: tracts with
median family income less than or equal to 90% of the MSA median family income, or tracts with a minority population
share of at least 30% and a median family income no greater than 120% of the MSA median family income. The "Low
and Moderate Income" goal specifies a target share of purchases to borrowers with income below the MSA median
family income. The "Special Affordable" goal targets borrowers with income below 60% of the MSA median family
income and borrowers with income below 80% of the MSA median family income in a census tract that has a median
family income less than or equal to 80% of the MSA median family income.
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Figure 2:
Test of Identification Assumption - Mortgage Originations Predicted by 1990 Tract
Characteristics
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Notes: Y-axis values are predicted using coefficients on census tract characteristics (see Table 1) estimated from a
tract-level regression of (log) number of refinance and home purchase originations on tract characteristics and MSA
fixed-effects (estimated fixed-effects not used to generate predicted values). Each data point represents the mean of
Y-axis variable within one percentage point bins of the X-axis variable. Also shown are local linear regression
generated fits of the underlying predicted values, created seperately on either side of the cutoff.
Figure 3:
Discontinuity
1997-2002
in (log) GSE-Purchased Originations in Census Tracts with TM 5 0.90,
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Notes: Includes owner-occupied home purchase and refinance mortgages eligible (i.e. conforming, conventional loan
originated by prime lender) and purchased by GSEs. Each data point represents the mean of (log) purchases in a tract
between 1997 and 2002 for tracts with one percentage point bins of the X-axis variable. Also shown are local linear
regression generated fitted lines of the underlying tract-level data, created seperately on either side of the cutoff.
Figure 4:
Falsification Exercise: Discontinuity in GSE-Eligible Originations at GSE and non-GSE Cutoffs
I I·::I :
I~ 14
11 11 1 II i+ iII 4 , !
III I .,I I
............ ...... ·r - . · ·....----... ..... .
0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05
Tract Med. Fam. Income, % of MSA
Notes: Each point represents the estimated discontinuity in (log) number of GSE-eligible originations in a tract between 1997 and 2002
from a seperate regression. Each regression includes tract covariates and scale variables and MSA-fixed effects, and bandwidth (h) is set to
0.02. Standard errors are clustered at MSA-level.
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Table 1:
Primary Variables Available in HMDA Dataset, 1992-2002
Variable Description
Year Year of mortgage application or purchase
Institution ID 10 Character Lender Identifier
Regulatory Agency ID Code indicating OCC, Fed, FDIC, OTS, NCUA (credit unions) or HUD as supervisory agency
Loan Type Conventional or government insured (e.g. FHA, VA)
Loan Purpose Home purchase, refinance, home improvement or multifamily (i.e. 5+ family property)
Occupancy Owner-occupied or investment property/second home
Loan Amount Dollar amount of loan
Action Taken Six possibilities: (1) Loan originated, (2) Borrower rejects lender offer (3) Application denied, (4) Application withdrawn
by applicant (5) Application incomplete, (6) Loan purchased by the institution
Denial Reason (optional) Institution can provide primary reason(s) for denial (e.g. credit history, insufficient collateral, debt load, etc)
Geography State, county and census tract of property
Income Gross annual family income, rounded to the nearest thousand dollar
Applicant(s) Race Race of primary applicant; race of co-applicant if applicable. May not be provided if telephone/internet application
Applicant(s) Sex Sex of primary applicant; sex of co-applicant if applicable. May not be provided if telephone/internet application
Purchaser For loans sold at time of origination, specifies purchaser of loan (e.g. Fannie Mae, commercial bank, etc.)
Table 2:
Census Tract Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Tracts 85 5 TM 5 90 90 < TM 5 95 p-Value
# of Census Tracts2  42,381 2,728 2,798
A. Loans per Tract per Year (1997-2002)
# Total Originations3  190.0 162.4 175.3 < 0.01
(217.6) (142.1) (154.8)
# GSE-Eligible Originations4  126.9 104.4 115.3 < 0.01
(154.4) (95.5) (106.3)
Purchased by GSEs 55.3 43.3 48.5 < 0.01
(74.7) (45.6) (51.1)
Purchased by non-GSE 27.9 22.4 24.4 < 0.01
(38.7) (24.4) (26.9)
# GSE-Ineligible Originations 5  63.0 58.0 60.0 0.21
(79.5) (57.9) (62.5)
Purchased by GSEs 2.8 1.6 1.8 < 0.01
(5.9) (2.6) (3.3)
Purchased by non-GSE 42.8 42.2 43.3 0.41
(55.5) (45.5) (48.7)
B. Census Tract Characteritics (1990)
# Owner-Occupied Units 1050.6 1044.5 1105.4 < 0.01
(686.0) (585.6) (596.2)
# Total Housing Units 1814.2 1856.0 1870.4 0.58
(1018.8) (966.2) (981.3)
Med. Home Value ($, 1990) 112,246.20 89,945.23 95,425.02 < 0.01
(86,830.49) (59,366.45) (64,444.07)
Prop. Units Detached 0.584 0.559 0.597 < 0.01
(0.278) (0.252) (0.235)
Prop. Units Mobile Home 0.047 0.077 0.069 < 0.05
(0.100) (0.128) (0.116)
Prop. Units Built 1980-1989 0.16 0.143 0.146 0.53
(0.169) (0.147) (0.146)
Prop. Units Built 1940-1969 0.426 0.442 0.447 0.34
(0.226) (0.217) (0.221)
Prop. Units Built pre-1940 0.204 0.217 0.200 < 0.01
(0.225) (0.220) (0.213)
Prop. Units in Multifamily Bldg 0.177 0.169 0.157 < 0.05
(0.209) (0.199) (0.181)
Prop. Population Age >65 0.128 0.139 0.138 0.58
(0.072) (0.072) (0.073)
Prop. Population Black 0.137 0.103 0.088 < 0.01
(0.250) (0.194) (0.172)
Prop. Population Hispanic 0.088 0.079 0.071 < 0.05
(0.162) (0.146) (0.131)
Prop. Population in Group Qtrs 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.67
(0.036) (0.032) (0.034)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. (1) p-Value testing the difference between columns 2 and 3. (2) See text
for discussion of sample selection. (3) Originations includes only owner-occupied home purchase and refinance loans.
(4) GSE-Eligible loans are conventional, conforming loans originated by lenders not classified as a subprime lender
(as determined by HUD). (5) Loans not likely to be eligible for purchase by GSEs: loan amount above the conforming
limit, FHA or VA loans, or loans originated by subprime lenders.
Table 3:
Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of the GSE Act on GSE Purchases of GSE-Eligble Originations in Census Tracts with TM 5 0.90,
1997-2002
Dependent variable: (log) # GSE-eligible & purchased originations, 1997-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
h = 0.05
-0.1045*** -0.0309**
(0.0160) (0.0133)
0.0154 0.0226 0.0307* 0.0382 0.0370**
(0.0279) (0.0232) (0.0166) (0.0257) (0.0181)
0.0159** 0.0095* 0.0071* 0.0113* 0.0064
(0.0065) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0066) (0.0053)
0.0163* 0.0029 -0.0020 0.0077 0.0028
(0.0097) (0.0078) (0.0059) (0.0106) (0.0075)
(8) (9) (10) (11)
h = 0.02
0.0180 0.0329** 0.0305 0.0376**
(0.0216) (0.0154) (0.0244) (0.0166)
(log) # GSE-eligible & purchased
originations, 1994-96
Kernel Weights
Covariates
rect rect rect rect rect
R-Squared 0.766 0.839 0.768 0.839
N 5525 5525 5525 5525
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at MSA-level, shown in parentheses. * p<0.10,
0.910
5509
** p<0.05, ***
rect rect
0.841
5515
p<0.01. All
0.913 0.851
5500 2208
regressions include MSA fixed
0.919 0.859 0.926
2202 2203 2197
effects and two tract-level scale variables
measured in 1990: (log) owner-occupied units and (log) total housing units. For list of covariates included, see Table 1. Dependent variable is the (log) number of GSE-eligible
refinance and home purchase mortgages purchased by GSE's between 1997 and 2002 at the census tract level.
l[TM< 0.90]
TM'
(TM')*1[TM < 0.90]
0.6264***
(0.0218)
0.6294***
(0.0238)
0.6302***
(0.0343)
0.6374***
(0.0343)
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Table 4:
Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of the GSE Act on Non-GSE Purchases
with TM 5 0.90, 1997-2002
of GSE-Eligble Originations in Census Tracts
Dependent variable: (log) # GSE-eligible purchased by non-GSEs, 1997-2002
h = 0.05
0.0100 0.0288 0.0066 0.0269
(0.0234) (0.0184) (0.0246) (0.0188)
0.0054 0.0080* 0.0039 0.0067
(0.0053) (0.0045) (0.0065) (0.0057)
0.0039 -0.0027 0.0033 -0.0024
(0.0079) (0.0069) (0.0101) (0.0092)
h = 0.02
0.0099 0.0314** 0.0016 0.0270
(0.0202) (0.0157) (0.0233) (0.0178)
(log) # GSE-eligible originations
purchased by Non-GSEs, 1994-96
Kernel Weights rect
R-Squared 0.818
N 5521
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at MSA-level, shown
0.4019***
(0.0200)
rect
0.866
5504
in parentheses.
0.4050***
(0.0215)
rect
0.822
5511
* p<0 .1 0, **
0.870
5494
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
0.3918***
(0.0280)
0.4036***
(0.0304)
rect
0.835 0.879
2207 2196
All regressions include MSA
0.846
2202
fixed effects,
0.889
2191
covariates (see
Table 1 for list) and two tract-level scale variables measured in 1990: (log) owner-occupied units and (log) total housing units. Dependent variable is the (log) number of
GSE-eligible refinance and home purchase mortgages purchased by Non-GSE's between 1997 and 2002 at the census tract level.
1[TM< 0.90]
TM'
(TM')*1[TM< 0.90]
Table 5:
Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of the GSE Act on GSE-Eligble
Originations in Census Tracts with TM < 0.90, 1997-2002
Dependent variable: (log) # GSE- eligible originations, 1997-2002
(1) (2) (3)
1 [TM< 0.90] 0.0211 0.0266** 0.0272**
(0.0167) (0.0104) (0.0112)
TM'
(TM')*I[TM< 0.90]
(log) # GSE-Eligible 0.7045*** 0.7139***
originations, 1994-96 (0.0332) (0.0328)
Kernel Weights rect rect tri
R-Squared 0.863 0.934 0.939
N 2208 2207 2202
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at MSA-level, shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All regressions include MSA fixed effects, covariates (see Table I for list) and two tract-level scale
variables measured in 1990: (log) owner-occupied units and (log) total housing units. Dependent variable
is the (log) number of GSE-eligible refinance and home purchase mortgages originated between 1997 and
2002 at the census tract level.
Table 6:
Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of the GSE Act on GSE-Eligble Originations in Census Tracts with TM < 0.90,
Estimates by 2-Year Period (h = 0.02)
Dependent variable: (log) # GSE-eligible originations, 1997-2002
1997-1998
0.0077 0.0138 0.0109
(0.0183) (0.0114) (0.0124)
1999-2000
0.0290* 0.0347*** 0.0314**
(0.0164) (0.0114) (0.0129)
2001-2002
0.0263 0.0312** 0.0345**
(0.0183) (0.0128) (0.0143)
(TM')* [TM< 0.90]
(log) # GSE-Eligible
originations, 1994-96
0.7826*** 0.7963***
(0.0340) (0.0318)
0.6785*** 0.6877***
(0.0350) (0.0367)
0.6793*** 0.6869***
(0.0357) (0.0366)
Kernel Weights rect rect rect rect rect rect
R-Squared 0.848 0.933 0.939 0.842 0.913 0.915 0.854 0.913 0.918
N 2208 2207 2202 2208 2207 2202 2208 2207 2202
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at MSA-level, shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include MSA fixed effects, covariates (see Table 1 for
list) and two tract-level scale variables measured in 1990: (log) owner-occupied units and (log) total housing units. Dependent variables the (log) number of GSE-eligible
refinance and home purchase mortgages originated in each of the three periods specified above at the census tract level. For all regressions, bandwidth (h) is 0.02.
1[TM< 0.90]
TM'
Table 7:
Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of the GSE Act on GSE-Ineligble
Originations in Census Tracts with TM 5 0.90 (h = 0.02), 1997-2002
Dependent variable: (log) # GSE- in eligible originations, 1997-2002
(1) (2) (3)
1 [TM 5 0.90] 0.0123 0.0134 0.0089
(0.0198) (0.0127) (0.0123)
TM'
(TM')*1[TM< 0.90]
(log) # GSE-Ineligible 0.5774*** 0.5877***
originations, 1994-96 (0.0207) (0.0215)
Kernel Weights rect rect tri
R-Squared 0.804 0.911 0.915
N 2208 2206 2201
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at MSA-level, shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All regressions include MSA fixed effects, covariates (see Table I for list) and two tract-level scale
variables measured in 1990: (log) owner-occupied units and (log) total housing units. Dependent variable
is the (log) number of refinance and home purchase mortgages originated not likely to be eligible for
purchase by GSEs (i.e. loans above the conforming limit, FHA or VA loans, or loans originated by
subprime lenders) at the census tract level. For all regressions, bandwidth (h) is 0.02.
